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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On September 17, 2014, a teen boy riding in the front 
seat of an SUV on the highway at night had a brilliant idea:  
If he set the driver’s armpit hair on fire, it might impress 
the girls in the back.  It did not turn out quite the way he 
planned.  “Teen Setting Underarm Hair On Fire Causes 
Rollover Crash,” reported news outlets the next day.1  The 
SUV ran into a ditch, flipped over, and threw three of the 
five occupants—all teenagers, none of whom were wearing 
seat belts—out onto the highway.  Miraculously, no one was 
killed.2   
This story is humorous and serious all at once.  
Humorous, because it embodies a head-shaking truth long 
acknowledged in our and other cultures about the crazy 
things kids do.  Serious, because the thoughtless yet typical 
action of one boy could have seriously hurt or killed these 
four children and possibly other people on the highway that 
night.  And it has a serious message:  Teens are different 
from adults, on average, particularly in ways that relate to 
the overvaluation of present rewards and sensations, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Deputies:  Teen Setting Armpit Hair on Fire Causes Rollover 
Crash, KHOU.COM (Sept. 18, 2014, 5:36 AM), 
http://www.khou.com/story/news/weird/2014/09/18/deputies-teen-
setting-armpit-hair-on-fire-causes-rollover-crash/15815971/. See also 
Jason Molinet, Lighting Driver’s Armpit Hair on Fire Caused Idaho 
Rollover Crash: Cops, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Sept. 17, 2014, 11:10 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/armpit-hair-fire-
caused-idaho-rollover-crash-cops-article-1.1943702; Ashton Edwards, 
Burned armpit hair prank ends in teens rolling SUV, FOX13 SALT LAKE 
CITY (Sept. 18, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://fox13now.com/2014/09/18/ 
burned-armpit-hair-prank-ends-in-teens-rolling-suv/.  
2  See id. 
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undervaluation of negative risk, the tremendous salience of 
their desire for peer approval, and their tendency to act in 
even more risky and thoughtless ways when they are 
together in groups.3  
We do not need neuroscience to tell us adolescents are 
different.  Cultures have recognized adolescent differences 
for a long time in a variety of ways.4  Our laws already 
recognize that adolescents are different from adults, 
limiting their autonomy or modifying their responsibility in 
myriad ways.5  Yet, we may benefit from new findings in the 
field of juvenile developmental neuroscience to help us 
understand exactly how and why teens are different from 
adults, and how our laws might do a better job of 
determining where to grant or limit autonomy and where to 
impose or mitigate responsibility.   
The ways our laws account for juvenile differences are 
highly inconsistent.  In some areas, the law allows juveniles 
dramatically less autonomy than adults, but in other areas 
the law imposes adult-equivalent punishment and 
responsibility.6  Contradictions between bodies of law are 
not in themselves necessarily problematic:  Different 
branches of law have different aims and normative 
underpinnings, and may balance the interests of different 
sets of stakeholders; accordingly, provided a body of law is 
internally consistent, varying or conflicting constructs 
across bodies of law may result from their different 
purposes.7  However, these contradictions do become 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  See infra Part II. 
4 See, e.g., Richard M. Dunham & Jeannie S. Kidwell, Rites of 
Passage at Adolescence: A Ritual Process Paradigm, 1 J. ADOLESCENT 
RESEARCH 139 (1986) (exploring how rites of passage facilitate the 
transition from adolescence to adulthood).   
5  See infra Part I (explaining how different legal regimes carve out 
different forms of treatment for minors). 
6 See infra Part I.B. (contrasting how the law totally denies 
adolescent autonomy in some areas, such as voting, but attributes full 
adult responsibility to other adolescent actions, such as the commission 
of certain crimes). 
7  Consider again voting in contrast with adolescent crime.  The 
different legal treatment of minors and adults with respect to voting 
serves the societal interest in informed decision-making, and the law 
plausibly draws a bright line at the age of majority.  In the case of 
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problematic when they arise, or are claimed to arise, from 
the same source.  If each domain of law that governs 
juveniles differently from adults purports to do so based 
upon juveniles’ different capacities, and then those domains 
embody different or contradictory notions of adolescent 
capacities, then they are in conflict.8 
The law acknowledges the liminal developmental status 
of adolescents in a variety of ways.  The criminal law 
incorporates a notion of developing responsibility, providing 
for no criminal responsibility for infants and toddlers 
children, an intermediate level of sanction for young 
children, a higher but non-adult level of penalty for young 
adolescents and teens who commit less serious crimes and, 
often, full adult responsibility for teens who commit serious 
crimes.9  This criminal law approach implies a linear model 
of development:  Youth start out with little or no capacity 
for responsibility and gain it gradually but globally as they 
mature; if they engage in serious or adult-like crime, 
however, then they must be capable of experiencing adult-
like consequences.10  In contrast to the criminal law’s linear 
continuum model, other areas of law afford autonomy or 
ascribe responsibility using an on-off toggle of age, based on 
a bright-line age cutoff.  Minors under eighteen may enter 
into but may electively void contracts, a regime that allows 
the minor to exercise autonomy but protects him or her 
from some of the commensurate responsibility.11  Other 
well-known on-off “toggle” laws prohibit individuals under 
eighteen from voting and buying tobacco and those under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
adolescents tried as adults in criminal cases, the law serves an entirely 
different purpose: to punish offenders and deter potential offenders.   
8  Since, for example, voting laws and criminal laws both account for 
the fact that adolescents suffer from a kind of impaired decision-making 
by virtue of being adolescents, and yet they come to contradictory 
conclusions, these legal regimes are in conflict. 
9  See 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 9.6 (2d ed.). 
10  See infra Part I.A. 
11  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981) (“Unless a 
statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur 
only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before 
the person’s eighteenth birthday.”). 
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twenty-one from consuming alcohol.12  The patchwork of 
laws across the country shows lawmakers’ disagreement, 
ambivalence, or confusion about juvenile autonomy and 
responsibility, as well as about the underlying actions being 
regulated.  Thus, not only do the current legal models of 
adolescent decision-making capacity appear inconsistent 
across legal domains, they also produce apparently 
inconsistent results within a given legal sphere. 
This essay first introduces a descriptive framework that 
creates a typology of existing state laws relating to the 
regulation of adolescent autonomy and responsibility.13  We 
categorize existing legal approaches to juveniles as 
consisting of total denials of autonomy, delegated autonomy, 
graduated autonomy or responsibility, revocable autonomy, 
and total autonomy.14  This typology is necessarily 
imperfect because the underlying material it describes is 
internally muddled, resisting neat categorization.  It is also 
imperfect because of the interplay of the concepts—and the 
facts—of autonomy and responsibility.15  This categorization 
attempt, though, reflects some genuine differences between 
various bodies of law and may help to show with some 
greater clarity the variety of approaches that the law 
employs when regulating adolescent autonomy and 
responsibility. 
In criminal law, there is theoretically a continuum of 
responsibility based on age and the harm caused—so the 
younger the juvenile, the less responsible.16  In reality, 
however, the law tends to toggle responsibility on or off 
based on the magnitude of harm, or, in other words, “adult 
time for an adult crime.”17  This emerged as part of the 
tough on crime movement during the 1980s that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  See, e.g., Your Rights and Responsibilities as a Minor, TENN. 
COMM’N ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/ 
tccy/attachments/om-rr-14.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2015). 
13  See infra Part I. 
14  See infra Part I.B. 
15  See infra Part I.B.  
16  See supra note 9. 
17 See David L Hudson Jr., Adult Time for Adult Crimes, ABA 
JOURNAL (Nov. 2, 2009) http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/adult_time_for_adult_crimes/. 
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significantly reformed juvenile law.18  So rather than doing 
a close examination of whether a particular juvenile is 
mature to a particular degree, criminal law looks mostly at 
the external factor—the crime committed.  
If a juvenile causes serious harm, the reasoning holds 
that what we have is a hardened, adult-like criminal in a 
child’s body, not a significantly flawed, juvenile thought 
process, such as not understanding risk or making good 
risk/reward calculations.19  Not understanding risk leads to 
the kind of bad judgment that causes you to light your 
friend’s armpit hair on fire while he is driving a 2000-pound 
SUV on the highway at night. 
A closer look at the empirical difference between 
adolescents and adults could produce a more coherent 
paradigm of juvenile decision-making capacity and 
responsibility.  The rapidly advancing field of 
developmental neuroscience has produced a wealth of 
knowledge that, when evaluated in relation to the interests 
of relevant stakeholders, could help legal scholars and 
lawmakers rethink areas of law pertaining to juveniles.20  
Responsibility entails a bundle of cognitive and social 
capacities that cannot be reduced to a simple continuum 
that runs from childhood nonresponsibility through to adult 
responsibility.21  Juveniles do not simply become more 
neurologically and socially adult-like across the board as 
they get older.  Instead, different parts of the brain and 
various decision-making capacities develop at different 
rates, and frequently may not develop in a linear fashion.22  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See, e.g., Juvenile Justice History, CTR. ON JUVENILE AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-
history.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).  
19  See infra Part II. 
20 See, e.g., Jennifer H. Pfeifer & Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, 
Adolescent Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience: Past, Present, 
and Future, 7 SOCIAL COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1 
(2012) (evidencing the range of neuroscientific interest in the adolescent 
brain). 
21 See, e.g., Leah H. Somerville & B.J. Casey, Developmental 
Neurobiology of Cognitive Control and Motivational Systems, 20 
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 236, 236 (2010). 
22  See infra Part II. 
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Adolescents may be more prone to certain risks and 
influences than adults, yet display other cognitive abilities 
that are on average equal to those of adults.23   
Adolescents’ particular deficits include susceptibility to 
peer influence, overvaluation of emotional information, a 
predilection for novelty, and poor impulse control.24  On the 
other hand, they appear to function equivalently to adults 
on many cognitive tasks.25  Adolescents may even 
outperform adults in some areas related to speed of 
cognitive or computational processing.26  Adolescents vary 
from each other, just as all individuals do.  Certain 
adolescents, like certain adults, may be unusually 
responsible or unusually impulsive.27  Different adolescents 
vary, too, in their degree of education, supervision, 
mentorship, and life experience.  All of these factors 
contribute to whether any individual adolescent is a better 
or worse decision-maker.  However, across the age group, 
the differences identified above are persistent, although in 
degree they may vary.  These differences in capacities and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Linda S. Gottfredson, The General Intelligence Factor, SCI. 
AMER. PRESENTS: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 24, 29 (1998),  
https://www.udel.edu/educ/gottfredson/reprints/1998generalintelligencef
actor.pdf  (“Individual IQ levels tend to remain unchanged from 
adolescence onward, and despite strenuous efforts over the past half a 
century, attempts to raise g permanently through adoption or 
educational means have failed.”). 
24   See Infra Part II. 
25   See Gottfredson, supra note 23. 
26  See, e.g., Joseph J. Thompson et al., Over the Hill at 24: 
Persistent Age-Related Cognitive-Motor Decline in Reaction Times in an 
Ecologically Valid Video Game Task Begins in Early Adulthood, 9 PLOS 
ONE e94215 (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://www.plosone.org/ 
article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0094215&re
presentation=PDF. 
27  Rhoshel K. Lenroot & Jay N. Giedd, Brain Development in 
Children and Adolescents: Insights from Anatomical Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 30 NEUROSCI. & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 718, 718–29 
(2006) (noting significant individual variability in development, 
including significant overlap in developmental trajectories between 
typically and psychiatrically abnormal adolescents; this work suggests 
that conclusions about abnormalcy versus typicality should not be made 
based on brain scans alone and conclusions should be reserved until 
relatively developmentally late in the life course). 
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abilities emerge from adolescents’ particular stage of 
neurological and psycho-social development, combined with 
adolescents’ necessarily more limited life experience.28   
This mosaic of adolescent differences and similarities to 
adults suggests, first, that a uniform legal autonomy and 
responsibility discount—say, a regime that would relieve 
adolescents of all forms of responsibility and of personal 
agency, equally—would be inappropriate.  It similarly 
suggests that the ways in which bodies of law currently 
modify responsibility and punishment regimes for juveniles 
may be inaccurately or incompletely drawn:  In most areas, 
the law focuses on factors peculiar to the legal context, such 
as the importance of the right in question, like the right to 
bodily integrity, or the severity of the harm that the 
adolescent caused, as in a crime of violence.29  An emphasis 
on the importance of the legal right or the extent of the 
social harm is important, but such concerns are external to 
and independent of whether an adolescent has appropriate 
decisional capacity in that context.30  Legal regimes need to 
consider both together:  It is the combination of the features 
of the relevant legal context and of the particular 
developmental capacities and vulnerabilities that ought to 
shape legal regimes relating adolescents. 
At its worst, current law relative to adolescents is an 
inconsistent and internally contradictory patchwork.  At its 
best, the law operates with an implicit idea of linear 
development, a continuum that suggests that juveniles 
mature at an even rate, gradually gaining autonomy and 
responsibility as they age.31  Even this continuum, however, 
is problematic in light of how juveniles mature and the very 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  See id. 
29  See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent 
Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 28 ISSUES 3 (2012), available 
at http://issues.org/28-3/steinberg/ (discussing a fact-specific analysis of 
juvenile responsibility in a case of felony murder). 
30  See id. (contextualizing the severe effect of felony murder—the 
death of an innocent person—with neuroscientific evidence of adolescent  
impulsivity, vulnerability to peer pressure, and short sightedness). 
31  See infra Part I.B.3. (describing how some legal regimes, such as 
those governing drivers licensing, may allow for several stages of 
increasing autonomy as the adolescent matures). 
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different practical and social considerations that operate 
across different legal contexts.32  In the place of the 
patchwork and the continuum, we propose a matrix.  A 
matrix permits lawmakers to appropriately consider the 
interrelationships between juvenile developmental 
neurobiology, the interests of other stakeholders, the 
institutional capacities implicated in particular legal 
regimes, and the relevant social norms.  We suggest that 
lawmakers think of the relationship between juvenile 
neurodevelopmental factors, legal and social norms, 
stakeholder interests, and institutional considerations, as 
relating in the following way:  Imagine a set of juvenile 
capacities and vulnerabilities on one axis of a matrix.  The 
other axes of the matrix consist of the interests of other 
stakeholders, the capacities of institutions, the presence of 
important or controlling social norms, and the signaling 
function of the law.  Like the neurodevelopmental 
information itself, the matrix does not determine the 
particular outcome.  Rather, it allows for clarity about the 
choices and trade-offs within any particular legal regime. 
Although the matrix concept may at first appear 
complex, it would provide a very simple tool for lawmakers 
who want to generate socially and normatively appropriate 
yet neurobiologically informed legal regimes.  Even binary 
regimes can be compatible with this matrix concept.  Take 
for example the context of alcohol consumption:  Alcohol is 
immediately gratifying, is frequently highly socially 
influenced, enhances impulsivity, and creates great and 
harmful externalities.33  The right output from the matrix 
would be “no alcohol consumption until 21” (or later), an age 
at which the peculiar deficits of adolescence are less salient 
and, socially, the intense peer environments of high school 
and college are behind the typical young person. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  See Steinberg, supra note 29 (explaining that the adolescent 
brain does not simply become more adult-like as the teenager ages: 
intellectual maturity arrives far sooner than emotional maturity). 
33  See, e.g., David J. Nutt et al., Drug Harms in the UK: A 
Multicriteria Decision Analysis, 376 LANCET 1558, 1561 (2010) (ranking 
the harms to self and to others of common drugs of abuse). 
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This idea of an adolescent responsibility matrix is not 
meant to suggest the individualization of justice based on 
each adolescent’s particular maturity.  Such 
individualization—even if it were possible, which it is not—
would not only be prohibitively expensive and inefficient, 
but would create excessive uncertainty in the law.34  An 
adolescent has to know, or at least be able to know, the 
operation of the law in advance so that he or she can plan 
and act appropriately.35  Any fully individualized regime 
would require an adolescent—or any party dealing with an 
adolescent—to gamble in advance on what some legal 
maturity determination might show down the line, which 
would be impractical at best and dangerous at worst. 
This can and should inform legal notions of 
responsibility, and accordingly, responsibility should be 
conceived of in a matrix rather than a one-dimensional 
continuum.  By matching developmentally disparate brain 
regions and their associated decision-making functions with 
various relevant areas of law, the matrix provides a higher 
resolution approach to specific legal situations while 
retaining the clarity of bright line rules for each area.  
Part I of this paper illustrates the diversity of legal 
approaches to adolescent autonomy and responsibility, 
showing inconsistencies in the legal limitations placed on 
adolescents’ behaviors and the punishment for adolescents’ 
transgressions.  Part II explores the neuroscientific state of 
the art with respect to adolescent brain development.  Part 
III maps this empirical data onto a few selected cases of 
adolescent behaviors of interest, exploring the relationship 
between brain development, behavior, and existing legal 
regulation.  Part IV proposes the idea of a matrix that could 
help lawmakers evaluate whether or how to use 
neuroscientific information in conjunction with their 
assessments of other stakeholder and institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  See, e.g., John Hagan et al., Ceremonial Justice: Crime and 
Punishment in a Loosely Coupled System, 58 SOCIAL FORCES 506, 510 
(1979) (explaining the tension between judicial efficiency and 
individualized justice). 
35  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) 
(explaining that liberty cannot flourish without legal stability). 
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interests, and normative and policy concerns, to create laws 
that are best designed to effectuate their intended purposes. 
 
II.  LEGAL REGIMES CONSTRAINING ADOLESCENT 
AUTONOMY: A TYPOLOGY 
 
Legal treatment of adolescence varies across and within 
legal domains.  This creates an unintuitive and often 
inconsistent framework for granting autonomy and 
attributing legal responsibility to adolescent actions.  
Recent Supreme Court opinions have turned to 
neuroscience to justify different punishments for juveniles 
than adults, for the same crimes.36  The Court has held that 
punishing juveniles equally to adults by imposing either the 
death penalty or life in prison without parole for non-
homicide crimes constitutes a violation of the Eight 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment.37  Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
on juvenile difference rests as much on evolving social 
norms as on neuroscientific findings, these recent opinions 
are exemplary in showing the ways in which social norms 
and scientific findings may interact to inform legal decision-
making.38 
 
A. Recent Supreme Court Holdings Recognize Juvenile 
Developmental Difference 
 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that 
imposing capital punishment on individuals who committed 
crimes as minors violates the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments as applied to 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment.39  In the majority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  See infra Part I.A. (discussing Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. 
Florida). 
37  See infra note 39. 
38  See infra Part I.A. 
39  543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling the prior standard that allowed 
for capital punishment for offenders sixteen years of age and older) 
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”)). 
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opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that Constitutional 
jurisprudence, rooted in “history, tradition, and precedent,” 
must be balanced with “the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”40  Kennedy 
looked to the prevalence of states’ rejection of the death 
penalty for juveniles to determine whether “our society 
views juveniles . . . as categorically less culpable than the 
average criminal,”41 and found that most states had indeed 
rejected such capital punishment.42  Confirming this 
reasoning, Kennedy cited empirical findings linking youth 
with poor decision-making, recklessness, vulnerability to 
peer influence, and underdeveloped character, which 
together preclude juveniles from having the extraordinary 
moral culpability required for the death penalty.43  The 
amicus brief from the American Psychological Association 
stated that adolescence involves increased risk-taking and 
an undervaluation of future consequences, undermining 
traditional justifications for the death penalty.44  The 
opinion noted that moral responsibility does not simply 
emerge across the board at a particular age, but that 
drawing a bright line at age eighteen instead of sixteen 
would better accommodate the vulnerabilities of juveniles 
and align other areas of law that recognize adulthood at age 
eighteen.45  
Picking up where Roper left off, the Supreme Court held 
in Graham v. Florida that, for non-homicide crimes 
committed when the offender was a minor, the sentence of 
life without parole likewise violates the Eighth 
Amendment.46  As in Roper, the Court in Graham first 
looked to “objective indicia of national consensus” on such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  Id. at 560-61 (citation omitted).   
41  Id. at 567 (citation omitted).  
42  Id. at 568. 
43  Id. at 569 (explaining that the primary purposes of capital 
punishment, retribution and deterrence cannot justify the death penalty 
for juveniles as they can for adults). 
44  Brief for the Am. Psychological Ass’n, and the Mo. Psychological 
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4-13, Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636447.  
45  Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
46  560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).   
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sentencing for juveniles and found a national consensus 
against it.47  Second, the Court turned to empirical evidence 
about the differences between juveniles and adults.  This 
time, the Court relied more explicitly on the emerging 
neuroscientific data amici first put before the Court in 
Roper.48  Validating its reliance on sociological and scientific 
studies in Roper, the Court found that “developments in 
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds,” such as a 
lack of fully-developed behavioral control and continuing 
character formation in juveniles.49  The Court also argued 
that, excluding homicide crimes, the severity of a crime 
committed by a juvenile cannot on its own establish the 
criminal’s settled and confirmed “moral depravity” required 
for a punishment as harsh as life without parole.50  Because 
of the unique vulnerabilities of juveniles, the Court held 
that life without parole cannot be justified by any of the 
traditional purposes of criminal punishment—retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—and 
therefore the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.51 
Roper and Graham illustrate the Supreme Court’s recent 
translations of empirical evidence, including neuroscience, 
into normative legal standards.  Such translations are not 
limited to the Supreme Court, nor are they limited to 
criminal law. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  Id. at 62-66. 
48  Id. at 68. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 69-70 (explaining that life without parole is “the second 
most severe penalty permitted by law,” one that permanently deprives 
the convict of liberty, like the death penalty, without regard for the 
possibility of moral rehabilitation). 
51  Id. at 71-74 (explaining that the case for retribution categorically 
diminishes for non-homicide crimes and for juveniles; that since 
juveniles are necessarily prone to rash decisions, they are unlikely—or 
even unable—to be deterred by harsh penalties; that juveniles are more 
capable of character development so they pose a lower risk of recidivism 
and need not be incapacitated for life; and that life without parole 
precludes the benefits of rehabilitation because the convict will never be 
allowed to reenter society).   
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B. A Typology of Legal Approaches to Adolescent Autonomy 
and Responsibility 
 
The law takes several approaches to differentiating the 
legal status of decisions made by adults from those made by 
juveniles.  With respect to adolescents, approaches include 
total denials of autonomy, delegated autonomy, graduated 
recognition of autonomy, revocable autonomy, and total 
autonomy.  
 
1. Total Denials of Autonomy 
 
The legal category we describe as total denial of 
autonomy encompasses activities totally prohibited until 
the decision-maker reaches a certain age, often the age of 
majority.  This means that the minor individual cannot 
engage in the activity, even with parental consent or under 
extraordinary circumstances.  Some total denials of 
autonomy are uniform across the fifty states.  Youth may 
not vote in federal elections until they reach age eighteen;52 
some states and localities, however, establish a slightly 
lower minimum voting age for certain elections.53  In all 
fifty states, consistent with federal policy, persons under 
twenty-one may not buy alcohol.54  In all states, minors may 
not buy tobacco products.55  State practices vary more in 
other areas.  In some states, minors categorically cannot get 
a tattoo, even with parental permission; in other states, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. Note that this amendment prohibits 
the federal or state denial of suffrage to individuals eighteen and older, 
but states are permitted to establish lower voting ages.   
53  See, e.g., Annys Shin, Takoma Park 16-Year-Old Savors His 




54  See Consumer Information: Alcohol Laws by State, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Sept. 2013), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0388-
alcohol-laws-state. 
55 See SLATI Overview Data, AM. LUNG ASS’N, 
http://www.lungusa2.org/slati/slatiOverview.php (last visited May 17, 
2015). 
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parental permission allows the minor to exercise limited 
autonomy in this area.56 
Total denials of autonomy are not unique to legal 
regimes governing minors.  The law categorically prohibits 
certain behaviors, even to fully competent adults.  Most of 
these prohibitions relate to preventing harm to others:  We 
are not free to injure, to force, to take without consent.57  
These prohibitions are basically other-regarding.58  A 
smaller category of prohibitions relates to limiting 
individuals’ autonomy relative to their own bodies.59  We 
are not free to consume illegal drugs, to sell our sexual 
services or parts of our bodies, or to consent to certain 
extreme forms of self-mutilation.60  Some private sexual 
behaviors remain illegal, even when engaged in by the 
proverbial “consenting adults.”61  The theoretical 
justification for these limitations is murkier and certainly is 
not unitary.  Justifications for the prohibition of drug use 
and prostitution, for example, range from utilitarian 
considerations about the negative externalities of these 
behaviors on communities and societies, particularly the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  See Tattoo and Body Piercing: State Laws, Statutes and 
Regulations, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG. (2009), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/tattooing-and-body-piercing.aspx. 
57  See, e.g., 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.2 (2d ed.) (explaining the role of 
criminal law in prohibiting harmful conduct). 
58  See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological 
Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1992) (explaining how Mill’s 
harm principle underlies and justifies other-regarding legal restrictions 
on autonomy).  
59 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, 1 CANADIAN J. 
PHILOSOPHY 105, 105 (1971) (“The principle of legal paternalism 
justifies state coercion to protect individuals from self-inflicted harm, or 
in its extreme version, to guide them, whether they like it or not, toward 
their own good.”). 
60  See, .e.g, Thaddeus Mason Pope, Is Public Health Paternalism 
Really Never Justified? A Response to Joel Feinberg, 30 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 121, 122 (2005) (exploring paternalism as a justification for 
restricting self-regarding behaviors). 
61  See, e.g., Danielle Augustson & Alyssa George, Prostitution and 
Sex Work, 16 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 229, 230 (2015) (noting the illegality 
of consensual prostitution in most states). 
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risks of violence and organized crime,62 to dignitary and 
paternalistic considerations.63  Prohibitions on certain 
private sexual behaviors, which, though antiquated, remain 
in many jurisdictions, are grounded in the notion of law as a 
form of public morality—and perhaps a residual sense of 
disgust.64  These, though, are the minority:  Legal denials of 
autonomy to adults primarily occur in those domains where 
harm to others not only would be likely but is the purpose of 
the action itself—like rape or battery.65  These, then, in 
contrast to the majority of legal regimes that deny 
autonomy to juveniles, reflect not a balancing of stakeholder 
interests, a utilitarian calculus, or paternalism, but the 
law’s core public protective function. 
 
2. Delegated Autonomy 
 
In some domains, the law prohibits minors from 
engaging in certain behaviors that would be lawful for 
adults.  Yet, rather than a total or categorical prohibition, it 
delegates to a parent or guardian the responsibility of 
authorizing the juvenile to engage in the action (or not).  We 
call this category of laws “delegated autonomy,” although it 
could also be conceived of as “delegated denials of 
autonomy.”  Delegated autonomy is common in the medical 
decision-making arena.  Generally, adolescents cannot 
obtain medical care of even the simplest kinds without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62  See, e.g., James M. Cole, Guidance Regarding Marijuana 
Enforcement, Memorandum for all United States Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE 1-2 (Aug. 29, 2013)  (listing federal priorities for enforcing 
marijuana prohibition, including sales to minors, criminal enterprises, 
diversion to prohibition states, pretext for trafficking other drugs, 
violence and firearms, drugged driving, cultivation on public lands, and 
use on federal property). 
63  See, e.g., Kevin S. Toll, The Ninth Amendment and America's 
Unconstitutional War on Drugs, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 417, 443-44 
(2007) (explaining and rejecting paternalistic and moralistic legal 
restrictions on autonomy with respect to drug use).  
64  See Augustson & George, supra note 61; see also Leon Kass, The 
Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 
216 NEW REPUB. 17, 19 (1997) (arguing that disgust forms a valid basis 
for ethics and regulation). 
65  See supra note 57. 
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express authorization from a parent or guardian.66  
Typically, a student cannot even get an aspirin or Tylenol 
from a school nurse without advance parental permission.67  
In more medically serious situations, a minor cannot obtain 
treatment at a hospital emergency department without 
appropriate adult consent unless the medical need is so 
urgent that consent cannot be obtained in time to avoid a 
life-or-death situation.68  Nor can teens opt into voluntary 
medical procedures, such as cosmetic surgery.  However, in 
all these cases, the adolescent can obtain the medical 
services—including cosmetic interventions—with the 
consent of the parent or guardian, a delegation of 
autonomy.69  And, adolescents retain some individual 
autonomy in this arena.  Even though they cannot 
independently consent to medical treatment, they have the 
freedom to give or withhold their assent.70  Assent is 
willingness; if the adolescent is unwilling to go through with 
a treatment directed by or consented to by the parent or 
guardian, it can constitute a violation of medical ethics (if 
not law) for the medical professional to go forward over the 
adolescent’s objections.71  Delegated autonomy regimes arise 
in a few areas apart from medical decision-making; a minor 
generally cannot marry but may, in some states, be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  Minors and the Right to Consent to Health Care, 3 GUTTMACHER 
REPORT ON PUB. POLICY (2000), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
pubs/tgr/03/4/gr030404.html. 
67  See, e.g., School Health Services, SCH. DIST. OF PICKENS CTY., 
available at http://www.pickens.k12.sc.us/Pages/Parents/Handbook/ 
School-Health-Services.aspx (“No aspirin and/or products containing 
aspirin will be given at school without physician and parent 
permission.”). 
68  See Minor Consent to Medical Treatment Laws, NAT’L DIST. 
ATTORNEYS ASS’N (Jan. 2013), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf 
/Minor%20Consent%20to%20Medical%20Treatment%20%282%29.pdf. 
69  See Plastic Surgery for Teenagers Briefing Paper, AM. SOC’Y OF 
PLASTIC SURGEONS, available at http://www.plasticsurgery.org 
/news/briefing-papers/plastic-surgery-for-teenagers.html (“As with any 
surgery, parental consent is required for all plastic surgery procedures 
performed on teens younger than 18 years old.”). 
70 See Committee on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental 
Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 315 
(1995). 
71   See id. at 316. 
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permitted to marry if he or she has parental consent.72  
Further, minors cannot join the military but may do so with 
the permission of a parent.73   
 
3. Graduated Autonomy 
 
Laws that operate on delegated autonomy require 
parental or guardian permission; they are binary, on/off 
regimes.  Some laws relating to adolescents are less 
categorical; rather, they provide for gradual, or graduated, 
autonomy for minors.  This approach permits teens to 
exercise partial autonomy and achieve full capacity based 
on age, without parental consent.  Graduated autonomy 
regimes may be found in range of legal domains.  
Increasingly, states are experimenting with graduated 
autonomy regimes for licensure of drivers, permitting 
limited driving hours and distances to younger drivers and 
requiring adult supervision for early driving, then 
gradually—based on hours driven and the age of the 
driver—permitting full driving privileges.74  Similarly, teens 
can enter into employment without the consent of a parent 
or guardian, but the law retains a protective function by 
limiting the hours, types of work, and working conditions of 
minors.75  In the area of sexual relations, the law, too, 
provides for graduated autonomy.76  Sexual self-expression 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72  See Teens/Minors Marriage License Laws, US MARRIAGE LAWS 
(2014), http://www.usmarriagelaws.com/search/united_states 
/teen_marriage_laws/. 
73  10 U.S.C. § 505 (2015).  
74 See Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) Laws, GOVERNORS 
HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N (May 2015), http://www.ghsa.org 
/html/stateinfo/laws/license_laws.html. 
75 See Child Labor Provisions for Nonagricultural Occupations 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Child Labor Bulletin 101, WH-
1330, U.S. DEP’T LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV. (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/childlabor101.pdf. 
76  In Indiana, for example, if one partner is underage, the law 
allows a defense to prosecution if the couple are in an ongoing 
relationship and not more than four years apart in age.  See Ind. Code 
Ann. § 35-42-4-9. 
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is a core area of autonomy and identity formation,77 yet can 
be fraught with risk.  States vary considerably but the 
general trend is toward allowing adolescents the same 
autonomy to engage in sexual relations with each other that 
adults enjoy, but protecting them from sexual advances and 
potential sexual exploitation by adults.78  Hence, most 
states have statutory rape laws that criminalize adult 
sexual conduct with teens yet also have “Romeo and Juliet” 
exceptions that ensure sexual relationships between same- 
or similar-aged teens are not construed as criminal 
exploitation, or that teen-to-teen sexting is not charged as 
child pornography.79  We conceive of this as a “graduated 
autonomy” regime because it allows juveniles to experience 
their developing sexual autonomy in a limited or quasi-
protected way while precluding certain sexual relationships 
that are more likely to be damaging or exploitative; in this 
way, it is somewhat analogous to graduated driving 
regimes.   
It is difficult to identify a principled distinction between 
subject matters governed by delegated autonomy versus 
graduated autonomy regimes.  In areas characterized by 
graduated autonomy, generally the activities governed are 
individually and socially beneficial but carry risks of various 
kinds and require the exercise of judgment.80  Accordingly, 
allowing young people to gain some experience while 
protecting them—and others—from the risks of unlimited 
autonomy seems reasonable.  However, the same may be 
said of the activities typically governed by a delegated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (“Liberty presumes 
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, 
and certain intimate conduct.”). 
78  See supra note 76. 
79  See Summary of Current State Laws: Statutory Rape – Criminal 
Offenses, ASSISTANT SEC’Y PLANNING & EVALUATION, DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERV., http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/sr/statelaws/summary.shtml 
(last visited May 17, 2015). 
80  Consider driving, a ubiquitous activity integral to autonomous 
decision-making and that connects individuals with society through 
recreational activities, education, and employment.  Driving can have 
serious health consequences to the driver as well as third parties, but 
the importance of the activity warrants graduated autonomy. 
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autonomy regime:  Medical decision making and sexual 
decision making both fundamentally relate to the body of 
the young person in question, both require certain maturity 
and understanding of risks to self and others.  Indeed, 
medical decision making may appear to be less likely to 
involve the risky and impulsive decision making almost 
inherent in sexual exploration.  Holding aside problems of 
administrability, a principled argument could be made for 
switching these two regimes.  We are not seriously 
advancing such a proposal, but we raise the point to 
highlight the lack of consistency that underlies many of the 
legal choices relating to the degrees of adolescent autonomy 
in particular contexts. 
 
4. Total Autonomy 
 
In some areas, the law provides adolescents with 
autonomy—at least front-end autonomy—equal to that 
enjoyed by adults, unrestricted by considerations of age or 
maturity.81  But this is not because, in these selected areas, 
youth are as mature as adults; rather, these categories 
consist of a heterogeneous set of practical and policy 
considerations that have led to isolated autonomy carve-
outs.  These include, non-exhaustively, adolescents’ ability 
to admit themselves without parental consent for medical 
treatment for substance misuse or mental health 
disorders;82 in some states, to obtain an abortion without 
parental or guardian notification or consent;83 to obtain 
medical advice and services related to contraception;84 to 
marry, if the female is pregnant.85  Adolescents may also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  “Front-end autonomy” refers to the fact that the law treats 
adolescents the same as adults with respect to taking particular actions, 
though it may later intervene to protect adolescents from, or punish 
them for, the consequences of those actions. 
82   See supra note 66. 
83  See State Policies in Brief: An Overview of Minors’ Consent Law, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (May 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org 
/statecenter/spibs/spib_OMCL.pdf 
84  Id. 
85  See Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico, CORNELL LEGAL INFORMATION INST., 
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enter into contracts with the same front-end autonomy as 
adults but, as with adults who suffer from various forms of 
diminished capacity, may later revoke the contract.86   
  
5. Censure-Based Responsibility 
 
The criminal law embodies both a protective and a 
punitive attitude toward juveniles.87  The juvenile justice 
system is popularly believed to set up a continuum of 
responsibility based on age and the harm caused.88  So, the 
younger the juvenile, the less responsible; the older the 
juvenile, the more responsible—a linear continuum on 
which responsibility increases gradually with age and 
maturity.  In practice, however, various legislative efforts to 
respond to sensational—or sensationalized—cases of 
violence have led to a much harsher and less 
developmentally informed juvenile criminal system.89   
Despite historical efforts to establish a legal continuum 
of criminal responsibility, with lesser responsibility for 
younger individuals, contemporary state criminal law 
instead has a set of statutory rules that direct some 
juveniles into the adult system and others into the juvenile 
system, even where the juvenile offenders are the same 
age.90  The determinations generally are made on the basis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/table_marriage (last visited Aug. 12, 
2015).  
86  See supra note 11. 
87  See supra note 9. 
88  See, e.g., Simona Ghetti & Allison D. Redlich, Reactions to Youth 
Crime: Perceptions of Accountability and Competency, 19 BEHAV. SCI. 
LAW 33, 45 (2001) (finding that people perceive an increase in 
blameworthiness and accountability for criminal actions perpetrated by 
juveniles in accordance with their age). 
89  See, e.g., Brenda Gordon, A Criminal's Justice or A Child's 
Injustice? Trends in the Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and the 
Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 194 (1999) 
(“Nationally, state policymakers, responding to public outrage and fears 
about increasing juvenile crime, are advocating ‘get tough’ policies in an 
apparent attempt to incapacitate specific juvenile criminals and to deter 
violent juvenile crime.”). 
90  Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction And Transfer To Adult Courts, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG. (Oct. 1, 2014), 
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of the harm the juvenile caused, not his or her age (much 
less his or her individual degree of maturity).91  The 
prevalence of adult penalties, and even incarceration in 
adult prisons for young adolescents, grew out of a tough on 
crime movement during the 1980s that resulted in 
significant reform in juvenile law.92  The mantra of the day, 
driven by fear of a new generation of crack-baby 
“superpredators,” was “adult time for adult crime.”93  
Instead of a close examination of a particular juvenile’s 
degree of maturity, criminal law generally looks to the 
external factor—the crime committed.   
The reasoning that underlies these laws is that if a 
juvenile causes serious harm, then he or she is not truly a 
child but rather an adult-like criminal in a child’s body.94  
We call this “censure-based” responsibility because the 
degree of penalty and the form of punishment focus on the 
degree of censure that is appropriate to the harm itself, 
rather than to any determination about the personal 
culpability of the offender who caused the harm.  These 
laws generally do not provide prosecutors or judges with the 
discretion to consider the alternative explanation: that the 
juvenile’s actions, and the resulting harm, could flow from a 
flawed thought process characteristic of juveniles, such as 
not understanding risk, or not making good risk/reward 
calculations, or being unduly prone to poor decision-making 
in the peer context—much like the teens in the armpit-fire-
highway-rollover accident.95  That case, which opened this 
article, is a perfect example of where stereotypically poor 
teen decision-making caused an accident—an accident that 
could have been charged as an adult crime if, through sheer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-
jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx. 
91  See supra note 9.   
92  See supra note 18. 
93  See Hudson, supra note 17. 
94 See Gordon, supra note 89, at 225 (explaining that flawed systems 
treat juvenile offenders as “’criminals who happen to be young, not 
children who happen to be criminals.’”) (quoting Alfred S. Regnery, 
Getting Away With Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs An 
Overhaul, 34 POL'Y REV. 65 (1985)). 
95  See supra note 1. 
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moral luck, the outcome had been worse than in fact it was.  
Given the uneven nature of juvenile development, we might 
ask whether such a continuum would be the appropriate 
way of accounting for juvenile difference in any event.  We 
turn to this question in Parts III and IV, and instead 
propose that a matrix of considerations replace the model of 
the continuum. 
 
C. The Result—Multiple Regimes Lead to Inconsistent 
Outcomes 
 
These multiple regimes lead to legal outcomes that are 
internally inconsistent and even counterintuitive.  In some 
ways, juveniles are entrusted with significant, even life-
and-death responsibilities.  In other ways, they are denied 
basic autonomy in even minor decisions.  A fifteen-year-old 
girl can legally work thirty hours a week at Wal-Mart, 
consent to sex with the same aged boyfriend, get married if 
pregnant, and check herself into drug rehab without 
parental consent.96  With parental consent, she can get a 
nose job and breast implants.97  But she cannot get an 
aspirin at school without parental consent,98 and she cannot 
vote, get a tattoo, drink, or smoke.99  In some jurisdictions, 
she cannot legally drive without an adult in the car.100  And 
yet, if her reckless driving kills somebody, she can be 
waived into the adult criminal justice system and be 
sentenced as an adult to decades in prison.101   
Do these different legal regimes make any sense or do 
they just comprise a historically contingent pastiche?  In 
Parts III and IV, we argue that it is bit of both:  Some of 
these legal choices about the degree of autonomy to grant, 
or responsibility to impose upon, adolescents make more 
sense, both as a matter of law and of developmental biology, 
than they seem to on the surface—while others fly in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  See supra Part I.B. 
97  See supra note 69. 
98  See supra note 67. 
99  See supra notes 52, 56; see 21 U.S.C. § 387f.  
100  See supra note 74. 
101  See supra Part I.B.5. 
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face of the principles of both sets of systems.  The disparate 
legal approaches to adolescent decision making may be 
perfectly appropriate in certain circumstances.  But they 
also may produce peculiar and inconsistent results.  Not 
only do some of the conflicts in legal regimes that govern 
and constrain juvenile behavior appear to be 
counterintuitive, they do not accord with the psychological 
and biological differences between juveniles and adults.  
Increasing understanding of the brain may now enable 
more sophisticated consideration of the relationships 
between the biology of adolescence and the law’s normative 
underpinnings and policy goals. 
 
III.  HOW – AND WHY – ADOLESCENTS ARE DIFFERENT 
	  
A. The Brain’s Adolescence 
 
The adolescent brain has pronounced strengths and 
weaknesses.102  To the extent that there is validity to the 
idea of general intelligence, or “g,” teens are as smart as 
they ever will be.103  General intelligence measures of 
performance on tasks such as cognitive speed and the 
ability to coordinate cognitive and motor performance 
increase through adolescence, peak at about age twenty-
four—the exact age at which the brain is said to be “adult” 
and “mature”—and decline from there.104  In important 
ways, late adolescents are mental athletes who are at their 
peak.105  Colloquially, we may say that teens are “dumb” but 
they most assuredly are not—or at least not more dumb on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  For an excellent overview of adolescent brain development, see 
generally Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent Brain Development: 
Vulnerabilities and Opportunities, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES 1 
(2004). 
103  See Gottfredson, supra note 23. 
104  See Joseph J. Thompson et al., Over the Hill at 24: Persistent 
Age-Related Cognitive-Motor Decline in Reaction Times in an 
Ecologically Valid Video Game Task Begins in Early Adulthood, 9 PLOS 
ONE e94215 (2014). 
105  See J.P. Rushton & C.D. Ankney, Whole Brain Size and General 
Mental Ability: A Review, 119 INT. J. NEUROSCI. 692-732 (2009) 
(showing that adult brains shrink about two grams per year and lose 
corresponding degrees of function). 
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average than adults.  When we say that teens are “dumb,” 
what we mean is:  They predictably do dumb things.106  
They take bad risks and make bad bets.107  They engage in 
actions for the wrong reasons, and to impress the wrong 
people.108  And, when making decisions, they frequently fail 
to bring to bear relevant facts or information that they 
already know—but that they cannot seem to make use of in 
the moment.109  This juxtaposition of ordinary, adequate 
intelligence and sub-par decision making indicates a 
disconnect.  Indeed, there are literal disconnects:  As 
different regions of the adolescent brain mature at different 
rates, and develop connections to each other only during 
and through the maturation process, it is possible for an 
adolescent to know something with one part of his or her 
brain but not with another—or to be less able than an adult 
to mediate between conflicting mental processes and arrive 
at an integrated decision.110  In particular, adolescents 
suffer relative to adults in their capacities to assess what is 
a good versus a bad risk, to inhibit impulses, and to silence 
the inner roar of concerns about what their peers think of 
them.111  This short section will first define adolescence and 
then look at the developmental neuroscience findings that 
help explain these deficits. 
“Adolescence” denotes the time between childhood and 
adulthood, typically defined as beginning with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106  See, e.g., supra note 1.  
107 See Leah H. Somerville & B. J. Casey, Developmental 
Neurobiology of Cognitive Control and Motivational Systems, 20 
CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 236, 236 (2010). 
108  See Leah H. Somerville et al., The Medial Prefrontal Cortex and 
the Emergence of Self-Conscious Emotion in Adolescence, 24 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 1554, 1554 (2013) (explaining the neurological 
role of peer influence on adolescent decision making). 
109  See Somerville & Casey, supra note 107, at 237 (describing how 
adolescents overvalue immediate rewards to the detriment of goal-
oriented behavior).  
110  See Steinberg, supra note 29 (explaining that the adult brain 
distributes decision making process across multiple structures, 
integrating such functions as risk evaluation and planning ahead, 
whereas in adolescents, “[i]t’s as if the brain’s accelerator is pressed to 
the floor before a good braking system is in place.”). 
111  See generally Somerville & Casey, supra note 107. 
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physiological onset of puberty, between ages eleven and 
thirteen, and ending with early adulthood, by or before age 
twenty-four.112  These physical changes correlate with the 
acquisition of new responsibilities and social roles, placing 
adolescents in the midst of a struggle to form their 
identities while managing peer pressure and heightened 
emotional reactivity—a characteristic recipe for risky 
behavior and “sensation seeking.”113  In addition to these 
social and cultural changes, adolescents experience rapid 
physical changes from growth spurts to hormone swells.114  
Adolescents thus inhabit a cacophony of physical 
transformation, social experimentation, and expansion of 
responsibilities, a sensitive period for social and identity 
formation.115 
Spurred by the onset of puberty typically around age 
eleven or twelve for girls and twelve to thirteen for boys, 
secondary sexual characteristics and reproductive capacity 
develop, largely initiated by the release of hormones from 
the hypothalamus and pituitary gland.116   The brain’s 
overall size has already peaked a year or two before puberty 
begins,117 but maturity comes with the selective pruning of 
unneeded brain connections and the strengthening of the 
remaining connections among brain regions throughout 
adolescence.118  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112  See, e.g., Pfeifer & Blakemore, supra note 20, at 1; see also 
Thompson et al., supra note 104 (establishing 24 as the age of 
neurological adulthood).  What constitutes “adulthood” is not exactly 
clear, and can refer to the maturation of physiological and psychological 
capacities for independence and self-regulation, a legal determination of 
adulthood, and/or a cultural affirmation of adulthood. 
113  See Leah H. Somerville et al., A Time of Change: Behavioral and 
Neural Correlates of Adolescent Sensitivity to Appetitive and Aversive 
Environmental Cues, 72 BRAIN AND COGNITION 124, 125 (2010). 
114   See, e.g., Pfeifer & Blakemore, supra note 20, at 3. 
115  See generally id. 
116 See, e.g., Puberty, THE PATIENT EDUC. INST., INC. (2012), 
available at http://online.mufasser.com/modules_v3/ 
peditrcs/pdfp01a1/pdfp0101/pdfp0101.pdf. 
117  See Jay N. Geidd, The Teen Brain: Insights from Neuroimaging, 
42 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 335, 336 (2008). 
118  See B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL 
REVIEW 62, 67 (2008). 
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Along with social and physical changes, the adolescent 
brain undergoes significant structural and functional 
transformations.  Animal studies demonstrate that puberty 
catalyzes a spike in axon and synapse production, 
ultimately pruned back late in adolescence.119  Fiber density 
between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
continues to increase into the early stages of adulthood.120  
White matter accrues through adolescence and into early 
adulthood, caused by myelination, the insulation of fibers 
with cholesterol, which improves their electrical 
efficiency.121  Pruning removes unnecessary neurological 
connections, and persists throughout adolescence more 
significantly in the PFC than the accumbens, suggesting an 
earlier maturation of the accumbens.122  The increased 
development and interconnection among these brain regions 
temporally correlates with the new roles, interests, and 
responsibilities of adolescents, but the brain’s uneven 
maturation renders adolescents somewhat unequipped to 
handle these experiences. 
In addition to these structural changes, adolescence 
involves changes to neurotransmitter systems in both 
cortical and subcortical areas of the brain.123  Dopamine 
regulates excitatory and inhibitory communications among 
the accumbens, amygdala, and PFC and its expression 
peaks differentially in these areas over time.124  Dopamine 
receptors proliferate along the pathways connecting the 
limbic systems and the PFC more early in adolescence than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119  See id. at 336-37.   
120  See Somerville et al., supra note 113, at 128. 
121 Vincent J. Schmithorst & Weihong Yuan, White Matter 
Development During Adolescence as Shown by Diffusion MRI, 72 BRAIN 
& COGNITION 16, 16–25 (2010). 
122  See Somerville et al., supra note 113, at 127. 
123  See B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCIENCES 111, 113 (2008).   
124  Id. (“Dopamine projections to the prefrontal cortex continue to 
develop into early adulthood, with dopamine levels peaking in the 
prefrontal cortex during adolescence versus earlier or later in life in 
nonhuman primates and in rats.  Dopamine receptor expression is 
highest in the accumbens during early adolescence.”). 
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later on.125  This evidence produces a complex map of 
structural, connective, and communicative changes 
involving subcortical and cortical areas of the brain, which 
can help shed light on the formative years of adolescence.126 
Verifying this data in human studies involves the use of 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technologies such as 
structural MRI, diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), and 
functional MRI.127  These devices enable scientists to study 
neurological structures and connections, as well as the real-
time functioning of subjects’ brains as subjects perform 
various tasks or respond to stimuli.128  MRI studies have 
produced important data about the size and composition of 
brain regions during development.  The prefrontal cortex 
takes a particularly long time to mature, and the subcortical 
basal ganglia undergo significant changes.129  These 
subcortical ganglia are implicated in numerous functions, 
but for purposes of understanding adolescent behavior, we 
can focus on their role in behavior selection (e.g., “between 
these several options, what would be the right thing to do 
now?”)130 and cognitive coordination (“I have several 
different thoughts and impulses.  How do I align my 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors at this moment?”).131  
Michael Gazzaniga, the founder of the field of cognitive 
neuroscience, has called the PFC the seat of “free won’t”—
because of its role in overriding emotional impulses.132  
Related executive functions include planning, sequencing, 
organization, inhibition, problem solving, and behavior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125  See Adriana Galvan, Adolescent Development of the Reward 
System, 4 FRONTIERS IN HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1, 2 (2010). 
126  See Casey et al., supra note 123, at 114. 
127  See Casey et al., supra note 118, at 65. 
128  See id. at 65-70. 
129  See Casey et al., supra note 123, at 114. 
130  V.S. Chakravarthy et al., What Do the Basal Ganglia Do? A 
Modeling Perspective, 103 BIOLOGICAL CYBERNETICS 237, 244-49 (2010). 
131  Andrea Stocco et al., Conditional Routing of Information to the 
Cortex: A Model of the Basal Ganglia's Role in Cognitive Coordination, 
117 PSYCHOL. REV. 541 (2010).  
132  See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN: THE SCIENCE 
OF OUR MORAL DILEMMAS 95-96 (2006). 
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control,133 and can be measured with neuropsychological 
tests, such as the go/no-go task of inhibitory control.134  The 
relatively late development of the PFC and maturation of its 
connections to impulse-generating and emotion-generating 
regions of the brain may help explain the relative 
impulsivity and risk-preferring nature of adolescents—even 
when they “know better.”135  
 DTI shows promise in providing a finer grained analysis 
of how the brain strengthens some connections and prunes 
back others.136  White matter connections between the PFC 
and other areas have been associated with working memory 
and impulse control.137  Again, connections among different 
areas develop at different rates and times during 
adolescence.138  Enabling researchers to look at function in 
addition to structure, fMRI studies have confirmed the role 
of the PFC in the development of cognitive control and 
decision-making.139  Task performance studies show that 
adult brains specialize particular prefrontal regions for 
certain tasks, whereas children’s prefrontal areas function 
more diffusely, suggesting that neurological development 
involves both changes within brain regions and among their 
connections.140 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133  See, e.g., Akira Miyake et al., The Unity and Diversity of 
Executive Functions and Their Contributions to Complex “Frontal Lobe” 
Tasks: A Latent Variable Analysis, 41 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 49, 53-59 
(2000). 
134  See, e.g., Kurt P. Schulz et al., Does the Emotional Go/No-Go 
Task Really Measure Behavioral Inhibition? Convergence with 
Measures on a Non-Emotional Analog, 22 ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 151(2007) (supporting the incorporation of 
emotionally-salient stimuli into a traditional behavioral inhibition test). 
135  See Casey et al., supra note 123, at 116-17.  
136  Id. at 115.  
137 Id. (noting that prefrontal-parietal connections pertain to 
working memory and prefrontal-basal ganglia connections correlate 
with impulse control). 
138  Id. at 116-17. 
139  Id. at 115. 
140  Id. (referring to “flanker, Stroop, and go/no-go” tasks). 
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B. Developmental Disparity Between PFC and Limbic 
System 
 
Adapting to new roles and responsibilities, adolescents 
navigate unfamiliar territory by trial and error, seeking 
novelty, excitement, and reward.141  This often manifests 
itself as risky behavior as adolescents develop an 
experiential base to understand their newfound impulses 
and relationships.142  Uneven and disparate neurological 
development underlies these suboptimal behaviors.  
Prefrontal regions of the brain, which enable executive 
functions such as “top down,” inhibitory control over 
impulses, develop along with white matter at a relatively 
even, linear rate throughout adolescence.143  By correlating 
a steady increase in performance on impulse control tasks, 
such as resisting immediate rewards, with prefrontal brain 
regions of increasingly aged subjects, scientists have 
theorized that the development of top-down neurological 
control of impulses follows a linear trajectory.144  This 
means that not only do the prefrontal regions themselves 
develop slowly, but that their long-range connections to 
other parts of the brain develop slowly as well, and the 
cognitive capacities they facilitate do not mature until late 
in adolescence.145   
By contrast, the subcortical regions, including the 
amygdala, hippocampus, and thalamus—correlated with 
emotion, motivation, and reward—develop rapidly during 
early adolescence in terms of both structure and function, 
outpacing the slower maturation of the prefrontal 
regions.146  Since interactions between the cortex and 
subcortical regions play a major role in producing behavior, 
the disparity between the emotional and intellectual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141  See, e.g., Galvan, supra note 125, at 6-7. 
142  Id. 
143 See B.J. Casey et al., The Storm and Stress of Adolescence: 
Insights from Human Imaging and Mouse Genetics, 52 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCHOBIOLOGY 225, 226 (2010). 
144  See Somerville & Casey, supra note 21, at 238. 
145  Id. at 239. 
146  See B.J. Casey et al., Braking and Accelerating of the Adolescent 
Brain, 21 J. RESEARCH ON ADOLESCENCE 21, 22 (2011).   
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components of decision making create various decision-
making biases and vulnerabilities.147   
 
C. Emotional Control and Reactivity 
 
Manifesting itself as an overvaluation of emotional 
information, this developmental disparity often leads to 
poor decisions when emotional and intellectual evaluations 
conflict.148  An adolescent may “know better” than to take a 
particular, emotionally salient course of action, but poor 
cognitive control biases the individual in favor of emotional 
reactivity.149  With an insufficiently developed capacity for 
“free won’t,” adolescents have trouble inhibiting impulsive, 
risky, or aggressive inclinations.150  Logical calculations of 
risk and reward take a back seat to emotional significance 
and immediate reward.151  This may be related to weak 
connections between emotional processing regions of the 
brain and more cognitive, intellectual regions.  It may also 
be related to heightened activity in the nucleus accumbens, 
a brain region associated with reward processing. 
The amygdala assigns emotional significance to 
information determined to be salient, prioritizing it for 
translation into behavior.152  The amygdalae of adolescents 
tend to show larger responses than in adults and correlate 
with a poor ability to control emotional responses related to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147  Id. 
148  Id. at 22 (“[I]n emotionally salient situations, subcortical 
systems will win out (accelerator) over control systems (brakes) given 
their maturity relative to the prefrontal control system.”).   
149  See Casey et al., supra note 123, at 116-17 (“[W]hen a poor 
decision is made in an emotional context, the adolescent may know 
better, but the salience of the emotional context biases his or her 
behavior in opposite direction of the optimal action.”).  
150  See id. at 112. 
151  See id. 
152  See Geidd, supra note 117, at 338; see also Somerville et al., 
supra note 113, at 126 (“The amygdaloid complex, a cluster of nuclei 
situated in the medial temporal lobe, plays a critical role in processing 
information of biological significance, including emotionally evocative 
stimuli, potential threats, and cues depicting the emotional states of 
others.”). 
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aggressive behaviors and mood problems.153  Prefrontal 
areas regulate this process based on environmental 
feedback.154   
A major antecedent of adolescent emotional reactivity 
lies in the individual’s emergent task of fitting into new 
social groups.155  As children enter adolescence, they 
develop new social roles and experience heightened 
sensitivity to peer approval.156  fMRI studies of adolescents 
engaged in the game of “cyberball,” simulating experiences 
of social inclusion and exclusion, show that the ventral 
anterior cingulate cortex and insula respond to exclusion 
and that the ventrolateral PFC activates less in adolescents 
than adults.157  Another task simulating internet chatting 
demonstrated insula activation during acceptance, not 
rejection, suggests that the number of peers involved and 
the subject’s interest in the approval of each of those peers, 
affects the neurological response to acceptance or 
rejection.158  These and other studies of peer influence show 
that social acceptance and rejection implicate affective 
responses in the brain, significantly affecting adolescent 
decision-making by playing into their characteristic 
overvaluation of affective information.159 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153  See Somerville et al., supra note 113, at 125 (“[A]dolescents’ 
negative emotional states are not only frequent but their emotional 
responses also tend to be more intense, variable and subject to extremes 
relative to adults.”). 
154  See Derek G.V. Mitchell, The Nexus Between Decision Making 
and Emotion Regulation: A Review of Convergent Neurocognitive 
Substrates, 217 BEHAVIOURAL BRAIN RESEARCH 215, 226 (2011) 
(“[C]ommon functional computations underlie adaptive decision making 
and emotional regulation; furthermore, these computations are likely 
governed by overlapping areas of prefrontal cortex.”). 
155  Leah H. Somerville, The Teenage Brain: Sensitivity to Social 
Evaluation, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 121, 
121 (2011). 
156  See Pfeifer & Blakemore, supra note 20, at 5-6  (“Compared with 
children, adolescents are more sociable, form more complex and 
hierarchical peer relationships and are more sensitive to acceptance and 
rejection by peers.”). 
157  Id. at 6. 
158  Id.  
159  Id. at 7 (“[Peer interactions of various types are highly likely to 
arouse an affective response in adolescents….”). 
2015                    565 
 
HOW DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE CAN INFORM 
LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING ADOLESCENTS	  
None of this is to suggest that emotion only contributes 
negatively to decision-making.  The constructionist 
approach to neurobiological psychology holds that emotion 
and rational cognition are both types of attention, each with 
a proper role in decision-making.160 
 
D. Reward and Impulsivity 
 
The lack of prefrontal development in combination with 
heightened limbic activity (specifically in the accumbens) 
correlates with an overvaluation of rewards and short-term 
gains.161  Scientists differ on how to model adolescents’ 
uniquely impaired processing of incentives: some suggest 
that an under-recruitment of relevant brain regions renders 
modest rewards unappealing, leading adolescents to be 
disproportionately motivated by expectations and desires of 
high reward.162  Others believe that neurological over-
activity inflates sensitivity to reward, causing adolescents to 
seek novelty and sensation.163   Some studies suggest that 
these models may be reconciled by noting that they 
correlate with different phases of reward processing.  The 
under-activity model emerged from studies of anticipating 
rewards, whereas the over-activity model correlates with 
receiving rewards.164  Reward overvaluation can also be 
modeled interconnectively; the “triadic” model suggests that 
limitations in prefrontal executive control and amygdala-
mediated harm avoidance allow the overactive ventral 
striatum to control the translation of overvalued incentives 
into behavior.165   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160  Kristen A. Lundquist et al., The Brain Basis of Emotion: A Meta-
Analytic Review, 35 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCI. 121, 142 (2012) 
(discussing the constructionist approach to emotion, which holds that 
“affect, conceptualization, and executive attention (and perhaps other 
psychological operations) cooperate to realize a behavioral outcome.”). 
161  See Somerville & Casey, supra note 21, at 237. 
162  See Galvan, supra note 125, at 1. 
163  Id. 
164  See Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive 
Processing and Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGICAL BIOCHEMISTRY 
AND BEHAVIOR 212, 218 (2009). 
165  Id. at 213. 
566 INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW  Vol. 12:2 
 
A similar model holds that underdeveloped aspects of 
cognitive control, such as inhibition and working memory, 
combine with reward overvaluation to result in risky 
behavior.166  Response inhibition enables individuals to 
consider behavioral alternatives and choose appropriate 
actions; deficiencies in this system can bias a decision-
maker in favor of short-term gains.167  Concomitant 
deficiencies in working memory hinder comparisons of 
incentive information associated with multiple 
alternatives.168  In other words, a certain amount of 
cognitive control is required to process and compare 
expected features of different behavioral options, such as 
estimations of reward value, the likelihood of actually 
getting the reward, and one’s experiential history related to 
that reward.169  Importantly, studies show that adolescents 
are not necessarily bad at evaluating the risks of behaviors, 
but they have trouble integrating that information with 
other salient factors, which may be overvalued themselves, 
such as peer influence and affective information.170   
The developmental lacuna between prefrontal and limbic 
systems represents not only the evolutionary process of 
seeking novelty, pleasure, and independence, but also an 
imbalance between these emotional, short-sighted 
adolescent drives and the “self-regulatory competence” 
expected of adults.171   
 
IV. THREE CASES OF JUVENILE LAW ANALYZED VIA 
NEURODEVELOPMENTAL CRITERIA 
 
Adolescents are not uniformly disadvantaged relative to 
adults.  Some legally relevant contexts play into these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166  Id. at 217-18. 
167  Id. at 217. 
168  Id. at 217-18. 
169  Id. 
170  Kerstin Konrad et al., Brain Development During Adolescence: 
Neuroscientific Insights into This Developmental Period, 110 
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INT’L 425, 428 (2013). 
171 See Somerville et al., supra note 113 (quoting Laurence 
Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and Why?, 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51 (2004)).   
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disadvantages and vulnerabilities, to greater or lesser 
extents, while others do not.  Surges in novelty-seeking 
behavior and sensitivity to peer influence, combined with 
the slower maturation of impulse control, lead to 
characteristically emotional decision-making and poor 
risk/reward evaluations.172  With this knowledge in hand, 
policymakers can have a more accurate starting point to 
map the particular vulnerabilities of adolescents onto 
legally significant behaviors.  This can inform in more 
nuanced and precise ways the analysis of where the law 
ought, or ought not, to limit the autonomy it extends and 
the responsibility it imposes on adolescents.   
This Part will examine three cases relating specifically 
to adolescents:  the case of tattooing; the case of alcohol and 
tobacco regulation; and the case of criminal responsibility 
for intentional violence.  It will then evaluate those topics in 
light of juvenile developmental neuroscience, the interests 
of other stakeholders, and the institutional considerations 
that frame them.  The purpose is to use these cases as 
models for how lawmakers might analyze juvenile 
developmental neuroscience in behavioral, legal, and social 
context to inform lawmaking.  The conclusions of these case 
studies inform the proposal that we make, for a formalized 
analytical matrix, in Part IV. 
 
A. The Case of Tattooing 
 
Tattooing presents an interesting case relative to the 
regulation of adolescent behavior.  It seems serious and 
unserious at the same time.  On the one hand, a tattoo is a 
life-long commitment.173  On the other hand, it is just body 
art; unlike drinking, driving, or using drugs, tattoos carry 
little to no risk of harming or killing oneself, and no such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  See supra Part II. 
173  See, e.g., Olga Khazan, The Secret to a Tattoo’s Permanence: 
The Immune System, THE ATLANTIC HEALTH (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/07/the-real-reason-
tattoos-are-permanent/374825/ (explaining why tattoos last a lifetime). 
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risk to others.174  Does it make sense to have an absolute 
prohibition against adolescent tattooing, while permitting 
adolescents to check themselves into a drug treatment 
center or obtain an abortion—decisions that seem more 
momentous and weighty?  Examining the case of tattooing, 
it seems that the law makes sense on one view of what it is 
that law is supposed to do.  But a closer examination shows 
that, despite the unfortunate relationship between tattooing 
and adolescent vulnerabilities in decision making, various 
extra-neuroscientific factors, including legal norms, social 
norms, and institutional considerations, must combine with 
judgments about adolescents to justify legal regimes 
relating to the practice.  Neurodevelopmental biology 
suggests that teens may need to be protected from making a 
bad decision relative to this activity more than relative to 
other kinds of activities, but the enactment of a legal 
prohibition still rests on a sort of aesthetic paternalism, a 
social choice that is certainly contestable and not required 
by particular scientific findings.175   
Tattooing seems to fit in with all major forms of 
adolescent psycho-social difference.  Tattooing is often 
related to significant peer influence.176  One need only look 
at the massively increased popularity of tattoos in the last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 But see Think Before You Ink: Are Tattoos Safe?, FDA 
CONSUMER HEALTH INFORMATION (October 2009), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM1
43401.pdf (explaining that tattoo needles and inks carry some risk of 
infection, allergic reaction, scarring, granulomas, and MRI 
complications).   
175  See Feinberg, supra note 59, at 116 (“The state might even be 
justified in using its taxing, regulatory, and persuasive powers to make 
[a potentially risky activity] more difficult or less attractive; but to 
prohibit it outright for everyone would be to tell the voluntary risk-taker 
that even his informed judgments of what is worthwhile are less 
reasonable than those of the state, and that therefore, he may not act on 
them…. As a principle of public policy, it has an acrid moral flavor, and 
creates serious risks of governmental tyranny.”).  Query, however, 
whether adolescent neurological vulnerabilities justify a paternalistic 
approach.  Are teens—subject to their limited decision making 
capacities—voluntary risk-takers making informed judgments? 
176  See, e.g., Alden E. Roberts & Jerome R. Koch, Correlates of 
Tattoos and Reference Groups, 99 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 933 (2006). 
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decade to see that, since it is socially acceptable or even 
desirable, more people do it.177  Despite its popularity, it 
remains perceived as a risky or transgressive thing to do, 
because it can be accepted by one’s peer group but frowned 
upon by one’s parents’ generation; thus, it can mark both 
fitting in and rebelling, an irresistible combination for teen 
identity formation.178  It is also a sensation-seeking activity, 
as one might wonder what it feels like to get a tattoo or to 
walk around having one.179  And it may be the product of 
extreme temporal discounting:  “I love this so much now 
that I cannot imagine being unhappy with it in the future.  I 
will always want my favorite band’s name tattooed on my 
face.”180  
Given tattooing’s remarkable fit with each of the major 
vulnerabilities in average adolescent decision making, does 
this suggest that laws categorically barring juveniles from 
obtaining tattoos (even with parental consent), are blessed 
by biology?  Can we derive the right legal regime relative to 
tattoos from this analysis of the relationship between 
juvenile developmental biology and the social signification 
of the practice of tattooing?   
Not quite:  Whether there is a role for the legal 
regulation of this behavior still depends on a normative 
account of what the law is supposed to do.  Barring 
tattooing is paternalistic and limits autonomy.  Tattooing 
does not have any significant negative externalities.  If an 
individual gets a stupid tattoo, he or she alone suffers; it is 
not like drinking and driving, which presents significant 
risk to others.  We might also ask whether the type of harm 
that an individual suffers from getting a regretted tattoo is 
the kind of harm from which the law is supposed to protect 
individuals.  The kind of harm here is not like the harm of 
smoking, which can lead to disease and death, or the harm 
of unsupervised driving, which can lead to the deaths of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177  See, e.g., Samantha Braverman, One in Five U.S. Adults Now 
Has a Tattoo, THE HARRIS POLL (Feb. 23, 2012). 
178  See id. (showing that despite the increasing prevalence of 
tattoos, they are still largely seen as a sign of rebelliousness).   
179  See Somerville et al., supra note 113. 
180  See Geier & Luna, supra note 164, at 217. 
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others.  Here, the harms (if any) are emotional and 
aesthetic.   
Ought the law to be engaging in aesthetic paternalism?  
If so, should the law, on the same grounds, require a forty-
eight-hour waiting period before a teen can get an 
unfortunate but trendy hair cut?  If the aim of the laws 
categorically barring tattoos is to save juveniles from the 
long-term emotional regret of a bad decision, then should 
the law require that teens, e.g., receive judicial permission 
before breaking up with that really nice boy or girl who may 
be “the one”?  On a libertarian view of the law, we could say 
“why is it a matter of concern for the state if somebody gets 
a horrible tattoo at seventeen that affects his or her 
professional and romantic prospects?”  The law’s 
paternalism toward adolescents is the only justification for 
this legal regime.181  One might object that an adolescent 
deciding to get a tattoo interferes with the parent’s rights 
over the adolescent;182 but in that case, if the parent is the 
stakeholder whom the law aims to protect, the appropriate 
legal regime would be to permit tattoos with parental 
consent—or to allow parents to tattoo their children even 
without the child’s assent, which is prohibited.  Calling the 
law paternalistic not is intended to be pejorative here; we 
merely are making clear the role that the law is playing 
relative to adolescents in this context. 
 In the case of tattooing, even though it implicates every 
teen vulnerability, there is no necessary outcome for the 
law. The law does tell us, though, that if we are concerned 
about the kinds of problems that do activate teen decision-
making vulnerabilities and that have long-term negative 
consequences (even if emotional or aesthetic), then these are 
the kinds of features of a decision where law may have a 
case for getting involved.  If one believes that there is an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181  See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) (“The State 
has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, 
whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes 
impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely.”).   
182  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (explaining the 
traditional and fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of 
their children).   
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appropriate role for some graduated autonomy in the law, 
even in areas where there are no significant externalities, 
tattooing would be the paradigmatic example. 
  
B. The Case of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Addictive 
Substances 
 
Just like getting a tattoo, vulnerability to misuse of 
alcohol, tobacco, and drugs of abuse arises from the 
combination of impulsivity, novelty- and sensation-seeking, 
overvaluation of affective information, and peer influence.183  
The misuse of these substances can have particularly 
negative consequences on the developing brain.184  And, 
unlike tattooing, teens’ misuse of these substances and 
potential addiction to them can result in life-long harm or 
even death to the individual, and may lead to the deaths of 
others.185  Thus, legal regimes that intend to consider the 
relationship between developmental neurobiology and the 
subject of regulation should attend to these factors in 
designing regulatory regimes.  Indeed, tobacco regulation 
has been a model in this area:  Following tobacco companies’ 
own insights that addicting children and young adolescents 
creates life-long customers, regulators have aggressively 
worked to limit juvenile access to all tobacco products.186   
Adolescence is itself a risk factor for the use of tobacco, 
alcohol, and drugs of abuse, and for the development of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  See supra Part II; see also Sunita Bava & Susan F. Tapert, 
Adolescent Brain Development and the Risk for Alcohol and Other Drug 
Problems, 20 NEUROPSYCHOL. REV. 398, 403 (2010) (finding that the 
“[p]redilection for risk-taking and sensation seeking during adolescence 
is associated with increased substance use and the potential for long-
term health problems.”). 
184  See Bava & Tapert, supra note 183, at 403-06 (explaining that 
adolescent substance use has detrimental effects on the brain’s 
structure and function, affecting cognitive capacities related to 
“attention, speeded information processing, spatial skills, learning and 
memory, and complex behaviors ….”). 
185  See Bharath Chakravarthy et al., Adolescent Drug Abuse – 
Awareness & Prevention, 137 INDIAN J. MED. RES. 1021, 1021 (2013). 
186  See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1140 (2014) (prohibiting the sale and 
distribution of tobacco products to persons younger than 18).   
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dependencies thereon.187   During the teen years, there is a 
sharp escalation in the use of alcohol, the most prevalent 
intoxicant.188  Rates of substance use also jump in the early 
teen years and rise dramatically throughout adolescence.189  
These behaviors provide substantial short-term rewards at 
the expense of long-term risks, implicating adolescents’ 
overvaluation of immediacy, pleasure, and recent 
experience relative to their limited ability to consider their 
future selves or the long-term implications that their 
actions may have on others.190  Further, “[m]ost risky 
behaviors in humans—including alcohol abuse—occur in 
social situations,” implicating adolescents’ susceptibility to 
peer influence.191  Adolescents are not the only people who 
use alcohol as a social lubricant, of course, or who leverage 
its well-known power to make one feel less awkward or to 
make others seem more interesting.192  However, 
adolescence is a “sensitive period” for social development, in 
which teens learn how to be social in the ways of their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187  See B. J. Casey & Rebecca M. Jones, Neurobiology of the 
Adolescent Brain and Behavior: Implications for Substance Use 
Disorders, 49 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1189, 
1197 (2010) (“This imbalance between these developing systems [rapidly 
developing  “bottom-up” motivational systems and slowly maturing “top-
down” cognitive control systems] during adolescence may lead to 
heightened vulnerability to risk-taking behaviors and an increased 
susceptibility to the motivational properties of substances of abuse.”); 
see also Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 
Results from the 2012 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: 
Summary of National Findings, SAMHSA.GOV (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2012SummNatFindDetTables/Nat
ionalFindings/NSDUHresults2012.pdf. 
188  See Bava & Tapert, supra note 183, at 403.   
189  See id. 
190 Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in 
Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and 
Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE IN THE PUB. INTEREST 1, 13 (2006). 
191  See Casey & Jones, supra note 187, at 1197. 
192  Ernest Hemingway reportedly said, “I drink to make other 
people interesting,” but literary and social history does not lack for 
examples of similar sentiments. 
2015                    573 
 
HOW DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE CAN INFORM 
LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING ADOLESCENTS	  
society;193 reliance on alcohol instead of on developing social 
skills can impair them long into adulthood from learning 
how to be. 
Use of such substances increase physical and social risks 
for the adolescent, and also can increase the risks that the 
adolescent poses to others.194  Adolescent drug and alcohol 
use risks harm to “brain functioning, cognition, and 
behavior.”195  Adolescents may be more vulnerable to the 
addictive and neurotoxic effects of alcohol.196  The 
developing brain may be negatively influenced by alcohol 
and marijuana, with “studies showing diminutions in 
neurocognitive functioning, especially attention, 
visuospatial functioning, and learning and retrieval of 
verbal and nonverbal information[.]”197  These functional 
impairments mimic the changes found in older patients 
with mild cognitive impairment or early stages of 
dementia.198  Further, the brains of adolescents who use 
alcohol or marijuana heavily also show changes at more 
fundamental levels, including “morphological changes; 
anisotropic differences in white matter; and a more 
distributed functional network and recruitment of alternate 
brain regions.”199  The full meaning of some of these 
observations remains to be elucidated in future studies but 
general import of these changes is to suggest that the brain 
is functioning in less efficient ways. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193  See Melissa Dahl, Age 12 is Like a Second Toddlerhood, NYMAG 
SCIENCE OF US (March 12, 2015), http://nymag.com/scienceofus 
/2015/03/age-12-is-like-a-second-toddlerhood.html. 
194  See, e.g., Teens: Alcohol and Other Drugs, AMM ACAD. OF CHILD 
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (July 2013), https://www.aacap.org 
/App_Themes/AACAP/docs/facts_for_families/03_teens_alcohol_and_oth
er_drugs.pdf. 
195  Bava & Tapert, supra note 183, at 403. 
196  See Casey & Jones, supra note 187, at 1196. 
197 Bava & Tapert, supra note 183, at 403 (internal citations 
omitted).   
198  See, e.g., Stella Karantzoulis & James E. Galvin, Distinguishing 
Alzheimer’s Disease From Other Major Forms of Dementia, 11 EXPERT 
REV. NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 1579 (2011) (describing visuospatial deficits 
in early dementia and Alzheimer’s Disease). 
199  Bava & Tapert, supra note 183, at 403 (internal citations 
omitted).   
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Adolescent substance use likely implicates neurological 
proclivity for risky behavior, poor risk/reward evaluation, 
and an overvaluation of affective information.200  Studies of 
adolescent binge drinkers showed that subjects performed 
worse on a common negative learning paradigm, known as 
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), than non-drinkers.201  The 
IGT measures how effectively a person can learn from a 
negative experience and modify his or her subsequent 
behavior.202  fMRI data revealed heightened activity in the 
drinkers’ left amygdala, suggesting increased sensitivity to 
affective information, and heightened activity in the insula, 
correlating with impulsivity and risky decision-making.203  
No difference in cognitive control areas204 was observed, but 
the scientists hypothesized that this could result from a lack 
of study power or the limited research subject sample.205  
Overall, this study suggested that many of the primary 
decision-making difficulties faced by adolescents correlate 
with binge drinking.   
The results studies suggest that the relationship 
between comparatively poor decision-making and alcohol 
consumption run in both directions:  Adolescents who 
initially scored lower than their peers on several dimensions 
of emotional control, but who were not yet binge drinkers, 
were more likely to report subsequent binge drinking.206  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200  See id. at 406. 
201 See Lin Xiao et al., Abnormal Affective Decision Making 
Revealed in Adolescent Binge Drinkers Using a Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Study, PSYCHOLOGY OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 1, 7 
(2012).  
202  The IGT is used to assess deficits in a variety of clinical 
populations, ranging from subjects that are addicted to those suffering 
from lesion injuries, traumatic brain injuries, and mental illnesses.  
Julie A. Suhr & Melissa T. Buelow, Construct Validity of the Iowa 
Gambling Task, 19 NEUROPSYCHOL. REV. 102, 102 (2009). 
203  Xiao et al., supra note 201, at 8. 
204 Including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPC). 
205  See Xiao et al., supra note 201, at 9. 
206  C. Anderson Johnson et al., Affective Decision-Making Deficits, 
Linked to a Dysfunctional Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, Revealed in 
10th Grade Chinese Adolescent Binge Drinkers, 46 NEUROPSYCHOL. 
714, 721-22 (2008). 
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Conversely, adolescents who engaged in binge drinking 
performed more poorly on tests of emotional regulation.207  
This suggests that the relationship between adolescence 
and binge drinking is not entirely age-dependent.  Some 
adolescents have relatively greater or lesser emotional self-
regulation, and relatively greater or lesser susceptibility to 
temporal discounting and sensation-seeking.  In other 
words, adolescents are individuals, too; it is not the case 
that all adolescents are equally at risk.208  However, since 
these vulnerabilities are more common in adolescents, and 
since the maturation process typically resolves these 
vulnerabilities in most normal individuals, a blanket 
prohibition on activities that key into and exacerbate them 
would appear to be indicated.  
Is this an instance where we can move from a factual “is” 
to a policy “ought”?  That is, do the set of biological and 
social facts about juvenile developmental vulnerabilities in 
relation to substance misuse tell us that we ought not to 
have a rehabilitation-focused regime rather than a 
deterrence-focused criminal regime? 
The relationship between adolescent vulnerabilities to 
substance misuse, and the significant internal and external 
harms of substance misuse, raises more provocative 
questions for law than does the case of tattooing.  It is still 
the case that no one role for law is dictated by the biological 
findings and social facts of adolescent substance misuse; 
yet, the biological and social facts suggest that certain legal 
regimes would be more prudent and more efficient than 
others in achieving the normative goals of harm reduction.  
There may be a dual role for law:  Strong regimes of 
prohibition on the front end, followed by—perhaps 
counterintuitively—lenient or rehabilitation-focused 
regimes on the back-end.  As teens are particularly 
susceptible to the negative effects of alcohol and drugs of 
abuse, they similarly have less control over whether they 
become addicted to these substances and over the ways in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207  See id. at 722-23. 
208  Casey & Jones, supra note 187, at 1197 (discussing how variable 
factors like alcohol dependence in the family can affect an individual 
adolescent’s risk profile). 
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which these substances affect their behavior.  This suggests 
that strongly punitive regimes aimed at deterrence will be 
costly for the state, yet achieve little; teens are less likely to 
weigh the prospect of future punishment relative to 
immediate reward.209   
The vulnerabilities of impulsivity and temporal 
discounting that make them more likely to make bad initial 
choices around alcohol and drugs, and to become addicted to 
alcohol or drugs, are the same vulnerabilities that make 
them relatively punishment-insensitive. The typical teen is 
even less likely than the typical adult to weigh the prospect 
of future punishment against immediate reward and be 
deterred by it.210  We similarly might expect even poorer 
judgment and self-control from an addicted teen than from 
an addicted adult, irrespective of punishment regimes.211  
Thus, punitive deterrence regimes aimed at teens in this 
arena are likely to result in high spending by the state for 
little impact, while producing significantly negative 
secondary effects as teens are processed through the 
criminal justice system.212  And, although they are more 
vulnerable to the negative effects of these substances, they 
are more susceptible to rehabilitation.213  In considering 
whether juveniles should be dealt with via criminal justice 
system or via diversionary and treatment programs, there is 
a strong case that addicted juveniles need diversionary 
interventions to protect their developing brains from the 
further effects of alcohol and drugs of abuse.214  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209  See supra Part II.D. 
210  See Reyna & Farley, supra note 190. 
211 See Bava & Tapert, supra note 183, at 405-06 (explaining that 
drug and alcohol abuse damages cognitive capacities integral to decision 
making above and beyond the neurological challenges adolescents 
already face). 
212  See, e.g., Jasmine L. Tyler et al., Cost Effective Corrections: The 
Fiscal Architecture of Rational Juvenile Justice Systems, THE JUSTICE 
POL’Y INST. (2006), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads 
/justicepolicy/documents/06-03_rep_costeffective_jj.pdf. 
213  See 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (describing adolescent offenders as 
“most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation.”). 
214  See David Gottesman & Susan Wile Schwarz, Juvenile Justice 
in the U.S.: Facts for Policymakers, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN 
POVERTY 4 (2011), available at http://www.nccp.org/publications 
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Drinking and drug use hit many of the same 
vulnerabilities as tattooing.  Among them are sensation 
seeking, impulsivity, temporal discounting, peer influence, 
and the ability both to fit in and rebel.215  But the 
differences with drinking and drug use are that they can 
alter the structure and function of the developing brain, can 
make a person more prone to substance misuse disorders in 
adulthood, and can exacerbate the mood swings and 
depression to which teens already are prone.216  Do these 
factors in themselves argue for legal intervention and 
prohibition?  Not necessarily.  One could take the 
libertarian position (presented above, with tattooing) that 
these problems are the concern of the individual affected 
but are not properly the concern of the state.217  The key 
difference, however, between the case of tattooing and the 
case of addictive substances is that the case for legal 
prohibition need not rest on aesthetic paternalism alone.  
Rather, unlike tattooing, substance misuse and abuse by 
adolescents can create significant, harmful externalities,218 
and provide a clear role for law in protecting adolescents 
and other social stakeholders.   
Thus, here, neurodevelopmental information provides 
more guidance to the law than it does in the case of 
tattooing:  Prohibiting tattooing is a paternalistic and 
aesthetic choice on the part of the law.  We understand that 
teens are more vulnerable to making bad decisions about 
tattooing, but they may be at risk of making bad decisions 
in many areas; whether to regulate any one versus any 
other stems in part from the permanence of tattoos but 
largely from the residual social stigma that hangs over 
them.  With addictive substances, the forms of harm present 
a stronger case for regulation under most dominant views of 
what the law is intended to accomplish: Drug abuse can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
/pdf/text_1038.pdf (explaining that community-based services, such as 
rehabilitation, better serve the needs of adolescents and society than 
other forms of juvenile incarceration).  
215  See supra Part II. 
216  See Bava & Tapert, supra note 183, at 403, 405-06. 
217  See supra note 175. 
218  See supra note 184. 
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lead to long-term developmental harm for the youth, there 
is little or no socially positive or expressive value to the 
activity (unlike tattooing, which can be a form of artistic 
self-expression, protected by the First Amendment), it 
creates externalities relating to the harms that the 
adolescent or future adult addicts can cause, and it can 
create long term costs to the state, including healthcare 
cases and heightened risks of future incarceration.  
  
C. Intentional Violence 
 
The case of intentional violence by adolescents presents 
different challenges for the law than the cases of tattooing 
and of addictive substances like tobacco and alcohol.  
Although tattooing and the use of addictive substances can 
present risks to the individual and create negative 
externalities, they are not all necessarily negative in 
themselves: alcohol219 or marijuana220 can be used 
moderately for pleasure and recreation; tattoos can have 
self-expressive meaning.221  Intentional violence, however, 
is a core form of criminal behavior that necessarily inflicts 
harms on others.  Also, unlike experimentation with alcohol 
or other moderately risky behaviors, engaging in intentional 
violence—particularly serious intentional violence—is not a 
typical developmental experience for adolescents.222  This 
short section considers what, if anything, developmental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219  See Alcohol Use: If You Drink, Keep it Moderate, MAYO CLINIC 
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/nutrition-
and-healthy-eating/in-depth/alcohol/art-20044551. 
220  See Dirk W. Lachenmeier & Jurgen Rehm, Comparative Risk 
Assessment of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis, and other Illicit Drugs Using 
the Margin of Exposure Approach, 5 SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 1 (2015) 
(showing that cannabis poses a low risk of toxicity when comparing 
typical human dosages with dosages shown to be fatal in animal 
studies). 
221  See Mark B. Stephens, Behavioral Risks Associated with 
Tattooing, 35 FAM. MEDICINE 52, 52 (2003). 
222  See Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, 
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. 3 (2004) (explaining that childhood 
exposure to trauma is predictive of violence in adolescence.  This 
suggests that adolescent violence arises in the wake of external, 
environmental factors, not as a natural part of brain development.). 
2015                    579 
 
HOW DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE CAN INFORM 
LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING ADOLESCENTS	  
neurobiology can tell us relative to adolescents’ commission 
of intentional violence.  We do not attempt to treat this 
important subject thoroughly here; instead, we are using 
the case of intentional violence to consider the relationship 
between developmental neurobiology and various contexts 
in which intentional violence could occur, for the purpose of 
showing how the conduct that may appear superficially the 
same can have very different implications relative to 
developmental maturity and the ability to engage in 
empathy, judgment, and self-control. 
In this section, we contrast two cases of intentional 
violence to demonstrate the ways in which an approach 
informed by developmental neurobiology would differ from 
current criminal law.  Both cases present scenarios of a 
fifteen-year-old boy committing a battery that results in 
serious bodily harm.  Under existing criminal law, the 
perpetrators in both cases likely would be waived into the 
adult system and tried as adults based on the nature of the 
crime and the level of harm that they caused.  However, in 
the first case, the adolescent is in a context that implicates 
many adolescent vulnerabilities, while in the second, the 
adolescent has the opportunity to exercise more considered 
and adult-like judgment.  If law aims or intends to 
discriminate between juvenile and adult conduct, and to 
provide some mitigation for adolescents based on their 
vulnerabilities, then the law ought to treat the perpetrators 
in these two scenarios differently.   
We conclude that the law currently overvalues the 
nature of act itself and the harm caused by the act when 
weighing the criminal consequences that a juvenile should 
face.  It is in the criminal area that the law most crudely 
and inappropriately divides juvenile from adult 
responsibility, by imposing adult liability on adolescents 
based on whether their actions caused great harm rather 
than by evaluating whether the actions were the product of 
mental processes that could be called “responsible” by an 
adult standard.223  Indeed, the ways in which the law draws 
the responsibility line between juveniles and adults is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223  See Hudson, supra note 17. 
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frequently by reference to inappropriate or even irrelevant 
criteria.  Instead, we argue that the law ought to consider 
the nature of the act relative whether the context in which 
it occurred triggered or implicated adolescent 
vulnerabilities.  A juvenile is neither necessarily responsible 
nor necessarily nonresponsible for an act of violence; the 
real question, we suggest is:  “Could we expect the typical 
adolescent to act with sufficient maturity and judgment in 
the context in which the act occurred such that he or she 
could be considered the equivalent of an adult under the 
circumstances?” 
 
1. Scenario A:  Vulnerable to Violence 
 
Consider a fifteen-year-old teenager who lives in a gang-
ridden neighborhood and is pressured to join a gang.  
Joining the gang presents some dangers—but so does 
refusing to join.  Initiation requires “shanking”—or 
stabbing—a member of a rival gang.  Egged on by friends 
and senior gang members, he stabs another boy in the leg.  
The blade hits the femoral artery and the victim nearly 
dies, but is saved by timely medical assistance. 
In most jurisdictions, this adolescent would be waived 
into the adult system and tried as an adult—possibly for 
attempted murder but at least for aggravated battery.224  
His gang membership may even be an aggravating factor in 
his charging and sentencing.  But should that be the case?   
Youth participation in gang activity has increased 
dramatically in the United States over the last twenty-five 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224  Issue Brief 3: Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, MACARTHUR 
FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE,  
http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf (last visited May 
17, 2015); Issue Brief 5: The Changing Borders of Juvenile Justice: 
Transfer of Adolescents to the Adult Criminal Court, MACARTHUR 
FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND 
JUVENILE JUSTICE,  
http://www.adjj.org/downloads/3582issue_brief_5.pdf (last visited Aug. 
12, 2015). 
2015                    581 
 
HOW DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE CAN INFORM 
LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING ADOLESCENTS	  
years.225  Youth gangs comprise loosely connected social 
networks and have a high turnover;226 most teens remain in 
a gang for only a year or two.227  Experts disagree over how 
to define gangs; some focus on the fundamental role of crime 
in group identity228 whereas others look to “shared identity, 
solidarity and identified territory” as defining 
characteristics.229  Still others rely on self-reported gang 
membership to determine when an association constitutes a 
gang.230 
Youth gang membership is strongly correlated with 
violent, criminal activity.231  Studies show that adolescents 
commit substantially more violent crimes during gang 
membership than before and after,232 supporting the 
“facilitation” model of transient gang membership.233  The 
facilitation model holds that gangs promote criminal 
behavior as opposed to attracting and selecting individuals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225  Kate O’Brien, et al., Youth Gang Affiliation, Violence, and 
Criminal Activities: A Review of Motivational, Risk, and Protective 
Factors, 18 AGGRESSION VIOLENT BEHAV. 417, 418 (2013).   
226  Id. at 419.  (explaining the contrast between reality and the 
stereotype of highly organized, stable gangs: “Research suggests that 
while this may be true for some, in most street gangs ‘leadership is 
ephemeral, turnover is often high, and cohesiveness only moderate and 
many street gangs are more a loose connection of cliques or social 
networks than a single, coherent whole.’”) (citations omitted).   
227  Id. (“Most youth who identify themselves as gang members 
report remaining in gangs for less than 4 years, with most being 
members for between 1 and 2 years.”) (citations omitted). 
228  See MALCOLM W. KLEIN & CHERYL L.  MAXSON, STREET GANG 
PATTERNS AND POLICIES 4-10 (2006). 
229  O’Brien et al., supra note 225, at 418. (citation omitted). 
230  Id.  
231 Id. (explaining that the extent to which an individual reports 
being associated with a gang correlates with the level of criminal 
activity that individual participates in.  For example, self-identified 
current gang members participate in more crime than individuals who 
have friends in gangs, and individuals not associated with gangs at all 
participate in even less crime).   
232  Terence P. Thornberry et al., The Role of Juvenile Gangs in 
Facilitating Delinquent Behavior, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 55 
(1993). 
233  O’Brien, supra note 225, at 419-20. 
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already prone to delinquency.234   Risk factors in numerous 
domains (individual, family, peer, school, and community) 
predict an adolescent’s eventual gang membership and 
violent criminal activity.235  These domains overlap with the 
unique vulnerabilities of the developing brain, especially 
with respect to peer influence and identity formation.  Peer 
groups like gangs strongly influence teenage beliefs and 
values through repeated exposure to the group’s accepted 
normative structures and by reducing exposure to 
alternative models.236  Acceptance and approval within a 
group plays into teens’ overvaluation of affective 
information, and social alienation has been found to be a 
risk factor for gang membership and violence.237  Thus 
gangs can provide a source of social status, respect, and 
friendship, especially for individuals in socioeconomic life 
situations that lack structured, pro-social group 
activities.238   
At the individual level, gang membership and youth 
violence have been correlated with emotional reactivity, 
impulsivity, sensation-seeking, and risk taking.239  Studies 
show that youth tend to leave gangs as they age and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Marvin D. Krohn & Terence P. Thornberry, Longitudinal 
Perspectives on Adolescent Street Gangs, in THE LONG VIEW OF CRIME: 
A SYNTHESIS OF LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH 128-60 (Akiva M. Liberman 
ed., 2008); But cf. Rachel A. Gordon et al., Antisocial Behavior and 
Youth Gang Membership: Selection and Socialization, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 
55 (2004) (suggesting that a synthesis of facilitation and selection 
governs gang membership, based on data showing that prior to joining a 
gang, youth often already engage in criminal activity, which increased 
during gang membership.). 
235  O’Brien, supra note 225, at 420. 
236  See KLEIN & MAXSON, supra note 228, at 4; David C. Pyrooz et 
al., Continuity and Change in Gang Membership and Gang 
Embeddedness, 50 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 239 (2012). 
237  O’Brien, supra note 225, at 421. 
238 See also Emma Alleyne & Jane L. Wood, Gang Involvement: 
Social and Environmental Factors, 60 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 547 
(2014); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REFORMING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 105-06 (2013). 
239  See KLEIN & MAXSON, supra note 228, at 4; O’Brien, supra note 
225, at 421. 
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mature,240 supporting the notion that the neurological 
vulnerabilities that dissipate as a teenager grows out of 
adolescence predispose youth to gang membership.    
Our hypothetical teen lives in a perfect storm of 
neurological and socioeconomic risk factors for gang 
membership and associated violence.  Gangs are peer 
pressure mechanisms.  They play into all of the age-typical 
adolescent neurological vulnerabilities:  Temporal 
discounting or the “short future”; impulsivity; poor 
risk/reward calculations that overvalue positive (even if 
unlikely) payoffs; discounting negative outcomes, even 
highly likely negative outcomes; the need for peer approval; 
and the use of the social group for identity formation.241  
Gang membership provides companionship and status as 
well as exciting, if short-sighted, opportunities for gaining 
recognition and respect in the community.242  Adolescents 
who experience poor-quality or absent parental modeling, 
poverty, and low quality schools are especially at risk.243  
They may also be violently pressured to join gangs or know 
that they will be the gang’s victims if they are not its 
members.244  Under the pressure of peer influence and the 
lack of alternatives (or lack of ability to perceive and access 
alternatives), joining and participating in a gang could feel 
inexorable.   
Nonetheless, the consequences of his initiatory act of 
violence are severe.  The victim was seriously injured and 
could have died.  Additionally, the teen now faces severe 
legal penalties that may change the course of his life.  
Under the principle of “adult crime, adult time,” a juvenile 
can be waived into the adult criminal justice system when 
he causes a certain level of harm.245  Accordingly, penalties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240  ROSS HASTINGS ET AL., LEAVING CRIMINAL YOUTH GANGS: EXIT 
STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMS (2011). 
241  See supra Part II. 
242  See O’Brien, supra note 225, at 422. 
243  See id. at 421. 
244 See Straight Talk About Youth Gangs: Facts for Educators, 
NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL 1, http://www.ncpc.org 
/programs/teens-crime-and-the-community/publications-1/adult2-pdf 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2015).   
245  See Hudson, supra note 17. 
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can include life without parole and, until the 2011 Roper 
decision, even the death penalty.246   
Should these policies take into consideration the unique 
neurological deficiencies of adolescents?  In Graham, the 
Supreme Court found that for non-homicide crimes, the 
purposes of punishment do not apply as strongly to 
juveniles: impulsivity and poor risk-reward calculations 
make deterrence likely to fail; that since juveniles are still 
developing, rehabilitation is a real possibility and they need 
not be incapacitated for life; and that retribution simply 
does not support life without parole for juveniles.247    
 
2. Scenario B: Deliberate Violence 
 
Now consider a same-age adolescent who lives in an 
affluent suburb and goes to a prosperous public high school.  
He begins dealing marijuana and prescription drugs at his 
school, making thousands of dollars a month.  He learns 
that another boy in his class plans to turn him into the 
school principal.  To prevent the other boy from turning him 
in, and to make a statement to any other students who 
might do the same, he stabs this boy in the leg – hitting the 
femoral artery and nearly killing him, but for timely 
medical intervention. 
This situation involves a serious, violent homicide crime, 
just like the first scenario.  But it does not implicate the 
same adolescent neurological vulnerabilities.  Unlike the 
peer pressure involved in joining and participating in a 
gang, this adolescent acted independently.  He neither had 
peers directly pressuring him to engage in violence nor 
would his identity in his community be placed at risk if he 
failed to commit a violent act, particularly since he lives in a 
community that does not valorize (or require) violence.  His 
act was not impulsive:  He deliberately planned the attack 
for the rational purpose of preserving his business.  
Moreover, the act is not one that is rewarding in itself (for 
typical individuals), so the typical teen overvaluation of 
positive reward also is not operative here.  Some typical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246  See supra Part I.A. 
247  See 560 U.S. 48 (2010); see supra Part I.A. 
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adolescent vulnerabilities may have contributed to his 
decision; temporal discounting may be at work, as he may 
not appreciate the impact his act could have on his own—
and his victim’s—future.  He also has a teen’s typical 
psychosocial and experiential limitations, and a teen’s 
(average) greater ability to be rehabilitated.  Nevertheless, 
his decision and action did not arise in a context that causes 
the typical adolescent to make poor decisions.  Plausible 
arguments for mitigation based on his age could be made, 
but here the weight of neurobiological factors would suggest 
that, in this context and on these facts, the adolescent is not 
significantly different from the adult. 
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
 
What we see in the various regimes governing adolescent 
conduct are a set of approaches to balancing stakeholder 
interests but that share a feature in common: the notion 
that adolescents lack judgment generally.248  In some areas, 
adolescents are allowed to exercise limited or conditional 
autonomy, but often less because the law deems them to be 
responsible decision-makers than for reasons of social 
expedience:  Allowing adolescents to work, for example, is 
historically rooted in traditional agrarian practices and 
remains important to the economic wellbeing of many 
families today.249  Where adolescents are endowed by law 
with adult-like responsibility, the law may do so without 
considering the qualities of the adolescent; rather, the law 
considers the culture’s overall normative judgment about 
the act.  To be more clear:  The criminal law imposes adult 
responsibility on adolescents when adolescents cause 
significant harm—harm that mandates, normatively, strong 
moral condemnation, which we conventionally express 
through criminal punishment.250  We engage in motivated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248  See supra Part II (describing the adolescent brain’s neurological 
limitations on decision making). 
249  See David H. Wegman et al., Protecting Youth At Work: Health, 
Safety, and Development of Working Children and Adolescents in the 
United States, NAT’L ACADEMIES PRESS 146, 151 (1998).  
250  See Hudson, supra note 17. 
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reasoning about whether the juvenile was acting as a 
juvenile or as an adult, reasoning that supports our 
intuitive desire to allow or to punish particular activities, 
not our rational assessment of the degree of the juvenile’s 
ability to engage in mature reasoning and conduct relative 
to the particular domain under consideration.   
But adolescents are not uniformly lacking judgment 
across the board.  Nor are they more responsible and 
mature in the areas in which the law imposes adult-like 
responsibility or culpability upon them.  Instead, juveniles 
mature in uneven ways.251  They have particular strengths 
and particular disabilities.  These strengths and disabilities 
may be entirely independent of whether the adolescents 
cause harm to themselves or others.  Indeed, juveniles may 
be particularly nonresponsible—in a developmental sense—
relative to the actions that have the capacity to cause the 
greatest harm.  Teens are, by virtue of age and immaturity, 
most likely to engage in reckless driving, reckless drinking, 
reckless sex, and reckless use of violence.  These are all 
areas in which adult like responsibility may be imposed on 
them—from freedom to marry, to freedom to drive, to full 
adult criminal responsibility for causing serious bodily 
harm or death.  
In tandem with the findings of juvenile developmental 
neurobiology, legal regimes should balance the interests of 
other stakeholders and the capacities of the various 
institutions that are implicated in particular legal regimes.  
We suggest that lawmakers can impose some discipline on 
the process of making laws for juveniles and balancing the 
interests of stakeholders and the capacities of institutions 
by adopting an explicit use of a matrix.  We suggest that 
lawmakers think of the relationship between juvenile 
neurodevelopmental factors, legal and social norms, 
stakeholder interests, and institutional considerations, as 
relating in the following way:  Imagine a set of juvenile 
capacities and vulnerabilities on one axis of a matrix.  The 
other axes of the matrix consist of the interests of other 
stakeholders, the capacities of institutions, the presence of 
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control systems mature at different times and rates). 
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important or controlling social norms, and the signaling 
function of the law.  Like the neurodevelopmental 
information itself, the matrix does not determine the 
particular outcome.  Rather, it allows for clarity about the 
choices and trade-offs within any particular legal regime.  
This moves us away from an insufficiently granular, and 
often unproductive, discourse about whether juveniles are, 
or are not, sufficiently responsible to have a particular legal 
form of autonomy or responsibility.  Instead, there can be a 
multidimensional assessment of juvenile capacities in 
relation to the needs and rights of other stakeholders and 
the broader societal norms and concerns that animate the 
need or desire for a legal regime in the first place. 
We do not purport to construct here the definitive matrix 
of all the legal, social, and stakeholder concerns that 
lawmakers or policymakers might analyze.  The 
neurodevelopmental criteria are the clearest.  These are 
provided by the science of juvenile brain development, and 
include the various juvenile vulnerabilities discussed 
throughout this paper.  The legal and normative criteria are 
less definite and more contingent, but several criteria on 
each dimension may be relatively uncontroversial and 
shared across legal and social contexts.  On the dimensions 
of stakeholder interests and institutional capacities, a 
decision matrix might include, e.g., whether the issue 
implicates a parent’s right to determine the child’s 
upbringing; whether a parent or institution could suffer 
civil or criminal liability for the juvenile’s action; and 
whether an institution has an interest in controlling the 
behavior in question for purposes of maintaining order (as 
in a school setting).  On the normative dimension, a decision 
matrix might include factors such as, e.g., whether the 
behavior creates significant externalities or risks to others; 
social or conventional moral attitudes toward the behavior; 
the importance of the liberty or privacy interests implicated 
by the activity; or any of numerous other potential 
normative concerns.  
The strongest case for prohibitive or protective 
regulation would exist where the action or behavior that 
would be regulated by law: 
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• Significantly implicates one or more typical 
adolescent neurodevelopmental vulnerabilities; 
• Creates significant costs or risks for other 
stakeholders;  
• Impinges on a parent’s right to direct the 
upbringing of the child to a greater degree 
than it allows for the adolescent to engage in 
expressive autonomy or self-creation, and/or 
does not have significant expressive autonomy 
meaning for the adolescent; and 
• Is normatively undesirable in itself. The 
weakest cases for prohibitive or protective 
regulation would exist where the action or 
behavior that could be regulated by law: 
• Does not significantly implicate one or more 
typical adolescent neurodevelopmental 
vulnerabilities because, for example, it 
concerns an area where the teen is not subject 
to peer influence or where there is not positive 
risk-taking or positive reward that is unduly 
attractive; 
• Has minimal impact for other stakeholders; 
• Does not impinge, or only limitedly impinges, 
on a parent’s right to direct the upbringing of 
the child;  
• The activity or behavior may be an important 
component of self-development, autonomy, or 
identity formation; and 
• Is at least normatively neutral. 
 
Taking this idea of the matrix, we can re-evaluate the 
several cases discussed in the part above and ask whether 
the structure of the legal regimes and the related legal 
outcomes should be different.  With each of these cases—
and, indeed, with any legal issue—we can ask not just “Are 
juveniles sufficiently responsible to engage in, or to be 
punished for, for X activity?”  Instead, we can disaggregate 
what “responsibility” means and ask, “Does this activity 
implicate the particular vulnerabilities of juveniles, 
2015                    589 
 
HOW DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROSCIENCE CAN INFORM 
LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING ADOLESCENTS	  
suggesting a role for legal limits?  If so, what are the other 
relevant normative and institutional considerations that 
may shape whether the activity is regulated and the form 
that the regulation takes?”   
After analyzing the target behavior on a matrix that 
allows us to cross-evaluate neurodevelopmental, legal, and 
normative considerations, a result might emerge that some 
form of legal control or regulation would be prudent.  The 
question then remains, “What should the law do?”  There 
are, generally, three choices:  The law may prohibit, protect, 
or punish.  The law may prohibit juveniles from smoking 
tobacco (and punish those who sell it to juveniles, not 
punish juveniles themselves for smoking).  The law may 
protect juveniles from working more than a certain number 
of hours, or may protect them from the sexual advances of 
adults.  And the law may punish juveniles for breaking 
criminal laws and causing harm to others, either less than 
or the same as it punishes adults.  Our proposed matrix (we 
suggest) indicates where legal regulation may be called-for.  
Normative criteria, not neurodevelopmental ones, set the 
agenda for whether the law will protect, prohibit, or punish.  
Considering neurodevelopmental factors in tandem with the 
law’s normative purposes, though, can nevertheless help 
determine whether a particular legal regime is consonant 
with its stated purposes or whether it inadvertently works 
at cross-purposes with its own aims.  Juveniles’ capacities, 
their strengths and weaknesses, can inform the law to 
create regimes that are tailored to better effectuating the 
law’s purposes.  Developmental neurobiology is one, and 
only one, aspect of creating legal regimes that are 
appropriate to how adolescents really are—how they are in 
their bodies and brains and social experience.  All areas in 
which some aspect of the law rests upon assumptions about 
what humans are like—how mature we are, how 
responsible we are, what kinds of decision-makers we are, 
what capacities we have—can be informed, although not 
determined, by neuroscientific information.  Using 
neurodevelopmental information to help craft legal regimes 
for adolescents is a model or microcosm for how more 
generally to craft regimes that integrate 
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neurodevelopmental and neuroscientific information.  
Neither juveniles, nor any other subject of the law, exist in 
isolation; all are components of webs of relationships and of 
sets of stakeholder and institutional interests, each of which 
should be understood with clarity so that the law as it exists 
is aligned with its purposes. 
 
 
